Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.8x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -72.8%. (2004–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $50M | $31M | $62M | $179M | $339M | $575M | $525M | $79M | $32M | $100M | $127M |
| Enterprise Value | $79M | $59M | $67M | $166M | $367M | $604M | $520M | $92M | $39M | $107M | $131M |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.75 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 4.06 | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.26 | 0.51 | 0.99 | 1.18 | 0.28 | 0.11 | 0.33 | 0.42 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.71 | 0.57 | 0.72 | 1.58 | 3.08 | 6.02 | 6.28 | 6.35 | 0.82 | 2.47 | 5.46 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | 4.70 | 121.77 | — | — | 109.60 | 64.63 | 14.82 | 8.44 |
| P/OCF | — | — | 5.96 | 3.58 | 22.05 | — | — | 11.43 | 5.14 | 8.58 | 5.91 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.25 | 0.55 | 1.04 | 1.17 | 0.33 | 0.13 | 0.35 | 0.43 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | 24.24 | 25.53 | 675.29 | 64.60 | — | 39.67 | 9.41 | 15.70 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | 328.07 | — | 1024.19 | — | — | 23.04 | 41.22 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | 4.37 | 131.79 | — | — | 128.53 | 79.10 | 15.85 | 8.69 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 29.0% | 29.0% | 33.4% | 33.9% | 34.9% | 33.9% | 35.0% | 30.0% | 27.2% | 29.6% | 30.4% |
| Operating Margin | -8.3% | -8.3% | -6.9% | -1.5% | 0.1% | -1.6% | 0.1% | -2.9% | -1.7% | 1.5% | 0.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | -9.2% | -9.2% | -6.9% | -1.2% | -0.1% | -1.8% | -0.3% | -11.2% | -1.7% | 7.9% | 0.2% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -72.8% | -72.8% | -41.0% | -7.4% | -0.9% | -11.5% | -3.2% | -123.2% | -12.3% | 75.4% | 3.2% |
| ROA | -25.5% | -25.5% | -17.3% | -3.3% | -0.4% | -4.9% | -1.1% | -33.9% | -4.9% | 26.3% | 0.9% |
| ROIC | -39.3% | -39.3% | -32.1% | -6.2% | 0.4% | -6.7% | 0.4% | -17.2% | -8.1% | 9.4% | 0.9% |
| ROCE | -40.4% | -40.4% | -30.7% | -6.7% | 0.5% | -7.2% | 0.4% | -21.3% | -9.9% | 10.6% | 1.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.02 | 1.02 | 0.49 | 0.34 | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0.38 | 1.28 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.44 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | 5.57 | 3.25 | 51.89 | 3.92 | — | 9.33 | 0.86 | 1.24 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.54 | 0.06 | -0.11 | 0.25 | 0.30 | -0.05 | 1.10 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.16 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | -1.87 | 1.94 | 31.59 | -0.52 | — | 7.26 | 0.61 | 0.44 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | -0.34 | 10.02 | — | — | 18.93 | 14.48 | 1.02 | 0.24 |
| Interest Coverage | -28.48 | -28.48 | -33.62 | -4.79 | 0.78 | -7.96 | 0.30 | -4.33 | -2.26 | 2.80 | 2.57 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.66 | 1.66 | 1.54 | 1.71 | 1.91 | 1.74 | 1.94 | 1.04 | 1.22 | 1.28 | 1.36 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.54 | 0.57 | 0.36 | 0.31 | 0.70 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.27 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.21 | 0.19 | 0.50 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.14 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 2.96 | 2.80 | 2.62 | 2.78 | 2.47 | 2.37 | 3.19 | 2.95 | 3.01 | 3.70 |
| Inventory Turnover | 4.09 | 4.09 | 4.34 | 3.46 | 3.17 | 2.77 | 3.23 | 3.74 | 4.25 | 3.94 | 4.15 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 4.71 | 3.78 | 3.98 | 3.53 | 3.14 | 5.20 | 3.47 | 4.70 | 2.97 | 3.93 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 24.6% | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | 21.3% | 0.8% | — | — | 0.9% | 1.5% | 6.7% | 11.8% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 2.4% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.4% | 5.8% | 1.1% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 2.4% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 1.9% | 6.0% | 1.1% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $6M | $6M | $6M | $5M | $5M | $4M | $4M | $3M | $4M | $4M |
Liquidity and solvency pressure
Based on current market data, the company trades at a P/S ratio of 0.09, a valuation level that suggests investors are pricing the equity as a distressed asset rather than a growth-oriented e-commerce platform, given the persistent negative earnings and ongoing revenue contraction observed in recent filings.
The extremely low P/S multiple indicates that the market has largely abandoned the growth narrative, likely due to the company's inability to achieve GAAP profitability at scale. This valuation level implies that the market is focused on the liquidation value of the company's logistics infrastructure rather than its future earnings potential.
As reported in historical financial statements, the company's ROIC has remained consistently negative, reaching a low of -13.9% in 2025Q1, which underscores a fundamental inability to generate returns that exceed the cost of capital while operating within the highly competitive automotive aftermarket e-commerce sector.
The trend of negative ROIC over the last ten quarters suggests that the company's capital allocation strategy has failed to create value for shareholders. This decay in returns is primarily driven by the inability to scale margins, as the cost of customer acquisition and fulfillment continues to outpace the gross profit generated by the business.
According to recent quarterly data, the cash conversion cycle has fluctuated significantly, reaching 54 days in 2026Q1, which reflects the inherent difficulty of managing inventory for bulky automotive parts while simultaneously attempting to maintain liquidity in a period of declining consumer demand and rising operational costs.
The volatility in the cash conversion cycle suggests that management is struggling to balance inventory levels with the need to preserve cash. Investors should monitor the DIO trend, as high inventory levels for non-conveyable parts represent a significant risk to liquidity if demand continues to soften.
Based on reported figures, the debt-to-equity ratio has climbed to 1.02 as of 2025Q4, indicating that the company is increasingly relying on debt financing to bridge the gap created by persistent operating losses and negative cash flow generation, which warrants further investigation into potential refinancing risks.
The increase in leverage is particularly concerning given the company's negative interest coverage ratios, which suggest that debt service is becoming increasingly burdensome. This trend indicates that the company's financial flexibility is narrowing, leaving it with limited room to maneuver if the current revenue contraction persists.
The P/E ratio is the most commonly misapplied metric for this business model, as it obscures the company's underlying operational reality by focusing on bottom-line earnings that are currently non-existent, thereby failing to capture the strategic value of the company's specialized logistics and proprietary fitment data.
Investors should instead focus on EV/Sales or a sum-of-the-parts analysis that accounts for the replacement cost of the company's distribution network. Relying on P/E in a loss-making, high-growth-intended model leads to a distorted view of value that ignores the potential for acquisition by larger industry players.
Includes 30+ ratios · 22 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying PRTS stock.
CarParts.com, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -0.8x. The historical average is 67.0x.
CarParts.com, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -72.8%. The historical average is -7.9%.
Based on historical data, CarParts.com, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -0.8x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
CarParts.com, Inc. has 29.0% gross margin and -8.3% operating margin.