Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -87.5x · EV/EBITDA 19.5x · ROE -18.4%. (2009–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $3.8B | $3.1B | $2.7B | $4.0B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $2.6B |
| Enterprise Value | $4.6B | $3.6B | $3.2B | $4.5B | $2.3B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $2.9B | $2.9B |
| P/E Ratio → | -87.50 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 164.36 | — | 67.71 | 72.41 |
| P/S Ratio | 4.57 | 4.89 | 4.05 | 6.46 | 2.84 | 5.14 | 5.06 | 4.65 | 5.62 | 4.70 | 4.57 |
| P/B Ratio | 14.81 | 15.87 | 18.42 | 38.24 | 14.22 | 9.08 | 7.40 | 7.17 | 7.94 | 5.57 | 5.71 |
| P/FCF | 102.56 | 109.87 | — | — | — | — | — | 56.31 | — | 104.98 | 61.02 |
| P/OCF | 39.47 | 42.29 | 31.15 | 41.51 | 18.81 | 21.89 | — | 12.16 | 35.60 | 11.74 | 14.07 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 5.78 | 4.79 | 7.34 | 3.65 | 6.03 | 5.99 | 4.97 | 6.04 | 5.07 | 5.02 |
| EV / EBITDA | 19.51 | 20.67 | 21.16 | 30.37 | 26.23 | 31.04 | 23.21 | 16.77 | 20.03 | 14.56 | 14.35 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 69.24 | 124.01 | 43.38 | 31.41 |
| EV / FCF | — | 129.86 | — | — | — | — | — | 60.16 | — | 113.35 | 67.10 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -3.8% | -3.8% | -8.4% | -4.4% | -14.2% | -8.5% | -1.6% | 7.6% | 5.3% | 12.3% | 16.7% |
| Operating Margin | -4.0% | -4.0% | -8.6% | -4.5% | -14.5% | -8.7% | -1.9% | 7.2% | 4.9% | 11.7% | 16.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -5.0% | -5.0% | -17.1% | -4.4% | -19.8% | -18.7% | -4.6% | 3.0% | -6.4% | 6.7% | 7.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -18.4% | -18.4% | -90.5% | -23.5% | -63.2% | -28.8% | -6.1% | 4.6% | -8.5% | 8.2% | 8.6% |
| ROA | -2.1% | -2.1% | -8.5% | -2.1% | -9.9% | -6.8% | -1.6% | 1.3% | -2.5% | 2.6% | 2.9% |
| ROIC | -2.7% | -2.7% | -6.6% | -3.2% | -10.3% | -4.1% | -1.0% | 5.3% | 3.2% | 7.1% | 9.5% |
| ROCE | -2.9% | -2.9% | -6.9% | -3.5% | -11.0% | -4.5% | -1.0% | 4.3% | 2.7% | 6.1% | 9.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 3.33 | 3.33 | 3.83 | 5.99 | 5.02 | 1.96 | 1.51 | 1.23 | 1.16 | 1.05 | 1.07 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.67 | 3.67 | 3.73 | 4.18 | 7.20 | 5.72 | 4.00 | 2.70 | 2.73 | 2.54 | 2.44 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 2.89 | 3.32 | 5.25 | 4.07 | 1.56 | 1.36 | 0.49 | 0.59 | 0.44 | 0.57 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 3.18 | 3.18 | 3.24 | 3.67 | 5.84 | 4.54 | 3.61 | 1.07 | 1.39 | 1.07 | 1.30 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 19.99 | — | — | — | — | — | 3.85 | — | 8.37 | 6.08 |
| Interest Coverage | -0.67 | -0.67 | -1.46 | -0.85 | -3.54 | -2.16 | -0.46 | 2.23 | 1.46 | 3.25 | 4.29 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.91 | 0.90 | 0.97 | 0.91 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.47 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.97 | 0.91 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 0.13 | 0.72 | 0.52 | 0.71 | 0.57 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.38 | 0.37 | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.39 |
| Inventory Turnover | 50.00 | 50.00 | 201.35 | 203.02 | 331.54 | 250.86 | 238.96 | 277.76 | 403.66 | 304.78 | 515.32 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 89.00 | 44.10 | 53.20 | 48.84 | 68.98 | 114.96 | 37.17 | 94.98 | 57.88 | 73.93 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | 1.9% | 0.4% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 0.8% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 121.0% | — | 60.7% | 49.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.6% | — | 1.5% | 1.4% |
| FCF Yield | 1.0% | 0.9% | — | — | — | — | — | 1.8% | — | 1.0% | 1.6% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.9% | 0.4% | 1.7% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 0.8% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $173M | $165M | $163M | $163M | $163M | $164M | $165M | $165M | $164M | $164M |
Structural wage-to-revenue imbalance
According to current market data, the P/S ratio of 4.77 and EV/EBITDA of 20.23 suggest that investors are paying a significant scarcity premium for Manchester United, despite the company's inability to generate consistent positive earnings or maintain a stable forward-looking valuation multiple in recent quarters.
The elevated EV/EBITDA multiple appears disconnected from the underlying operational reality of negative margins and high debt service requirements. This valuation likely reflects the brand's status as a unique, trophy-asset investment rather than a traditional cash-generative business, warranting caution regarding the sustainability of these multiples.
Based on reported figures, the ROIC has fluctuated between -3.5% and 3.5% over the last ten quarters, indicating that the club is failing to generate returns on invested capital that exceed its cost of capital, thereby destroying rather than creating shareholder value over the medium term.
The erratic ROIC trend suggests that capital allocation, particularly regarding player acquisitions, has not yielded the expected sporting or commercial returns. Investors should monitor whether the recent shift in ownership leads to a more disciplined approach to capital deployment, as current returns remain insufficient to justify the asset's heavy debt load.
As reported in financial statements, the asset turnover ratio remains consistently low at approximately 0.10 to 0.15, which highlights the extreme capital intensity of the business model and the difficulty in generating revenue growth relative to the massive investment in stadium and squad assets.
The low asset turnover, combined with a volatile cash conversion cycle, suggests that the club struggles to optimize its working capital, likely due to the lumpy nature of broadcasting and sponsorship payments. This inefficiency forces a reliance on external financing to bridge the gap between seasonal revenue inflows and ongoing wage obligations.
Based on the provided quarterly data, the D/EBITDA ratio has frequently exceeded 10.0x, reaching as high as 47.86 in 2024Q3, which indicates that the company's leverage is at a level that severely restricts its financial flexibility and increases sensitivity to interest rate fluctuations.
The high debt-to-equity ratio of 4.21 as of 2026Q3 suggests that the balance sheet is heavily reliant on debt, leaving little room for error in a business model already prone to volatile cash flows. This leverage profile appears to be a structural constraint that limits the club's ability to invest in necessary infrastructure upgrades.
The market frequently misapplies Adjusted EBITDA as a proxy for cash flow, which obscures the reality that player registration amortization and constant squad maintenance are mandatory operational expenses rather than discretionary items, leading to an overestimation of the club's true economic earning power and liquidity.
Investors should instead focus on free cash flow after accounting for player transfer net spend, as this provides a more accurate picture of the cash available to the business. Relying on EBITDA ignores the 'maintenance CapEx' required to keep the squad competitive, which is the primary driver of the club's ongoing cash burn.
Includes 30+ ratios · 17 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying MANU stock.
Manchester United plc's current P/E ratio is -87.5x. The historical average is 87.7x.
Manchester United plc's current EV/EBITDA is 19.5x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 22.7x.
Manchester United plc's return on equity (ROE) is -18.4%. The historical average is -4.1%.
Based on historical data, Manchester United plc is trading at a P/E of -87.5x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Manchester United plc has -3.8% gross margin and -4.0% operating margin.
Manchester United plc's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 3.7x, indicating high leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.