Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.4x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -371.5%. (2016–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $26M | $20M | $2M | $21M | $6.6B | $146.0B | $38.4B | $146.4B | $152.4B | $149.8B | — |
| Enterprise Value | $21M | $15M | $1M | $23M | $6.6B | $146.0B | $38.4B | $146.4B | $152.4B | $149.8B | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.38 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 1.15 | 0.90 | 0.76 | — | 1078.57 | 9127.84 | 4130.36 | 23233.91 | 40566.79 | 38063.49 | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.85 | 0.67 | 0.37 | 3.06 | 205.17 | — | 859.44 | 24205.83 | 31723.68 | — | 1.00 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 167538.98 | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 66598.42 | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.66 | 0.44 | — | 1079.81 | 9127.85 | 4129.23 | 23234.55 | 40567.62 | 38064.42 | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 167543.05 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 21.9% | 21.9% | 39.5% | — | 50.8% | 44.7% | 32.9% | -7.3% | -56.1% | -53.2% | 19.9% |
| Operating Margin | -182.2% | -182.2% | -873.9% | — | -284.0% | -307.8% | -270.1% | -478.7% | -470.1% | -366.9% | -31.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | -305.7% | -305.7% | -1111.9% | — | -1037.7% | -432.4% | -314.4% | -539.5% | -654.2% | -889.8% | -51.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -371.5% | -371.5% | -535.3% | -129.1% | -537.2% | -382.4% | -115.2% | -626.5% | -511.6% | — | -999.4% |
| ROA | -130.3% | -130.3% | -148.2% | -61.6% | -202.7% | -216.4% | -72.9% | -203.6% | -123.3% | -74.4% | -40.8% |
| ROIC | -200.5% | -200.5% | -278.1% | -17.5% | -83.2% | -286.3% | -100.6% | -404.3% | — | — | — |
| ROCE | -202.3% | -202.3% | -407.3% | -28.9% | -124.9% | -235.9% | -92.4% | -487.4% | -360.7% | -2989.2% | -108.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.37 | 0.37 | 0.47 | 1.35 | 0.52 | — | 0.17 | 0.34 | 0.87 | — | 4.03 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.18 | -0.16 | 0.42 | 0.24 | — | -0.23 | 0.67 | 0.65 | — | 3.33 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 4.07 | — |
| Interest Coverage | -195.47 | -195.47 | -24.06 | -1.21 | -28.91 | — | -10.35 | -13.25 | -14.23 | -7.66 | -9.48 |
Net cash position: cash ($17M) exceeds total debt ($11M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.09 | 1.09 | 0.49 | 1.21 | 1.21 | 0.45 | 2.50 | 0.49 | 0.46 | 0.22 | 0.59 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.77 | 0.77 | 0.37 | 1.07 | 1.13 | 0.45 | 2.40 | 0.46 | 0.38 | 0.20 | 0.57 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.24 | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.43 | 2.15 | 0.35 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.04 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.28 | 0.13 | — | 0.11 | 3.26 | 0.16 | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.14 | 0.80 |
| Inventory Turnover | 1.14 | 1.14 | 0.87 | 0.02 | 1.51 | — | 5.02 | 16.90 | 10.32 | 7.70 | 40.12 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 196.26 | 141.81 | — | 84.84 | 3.88 | 74.24 | 68.47 | 124.78 | 41.00 | 83.41 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | 48.5% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.0% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 5.5% | 7.0% | 32.6% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 5.5% | 7.0% | 32.6% | 48.5% | 1.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $16M | $227193 | $15900 | $167425 | $146000 | $38400 | $146397 | $152369 | $149780 | $0 |
Capital intensive certification timeline
Based on reported figures, XTIA trades at a price-to-sales ratio of 1.22, which appears to reflect a speculative premium for its aerospace development potential rather than the underlying performance of its legacy RTLS business, which currently provides the entirety of the company's revenue stream.
The current valuation multiple suggests that investors are pricing in the successful certification of the TriFan 600, effectively ignoring the significant operating losses and the lack of a clear path to profitability. Compared to pure-play eVTOL peers, this valuation may be distorted by the inclusion of legacy revenue, warranting further investigation into whether the market is overestimating the synergy between these disparate business segments.
According to recent financial statements, the company's ROIC has plummeted to -172.9% in 2026Q1, indicating that the capital deployed into the aerospace segment is currently destroying value rather than generating the returns necessary to sustain long-term growth for shareholders.
The deeply negative return on invested capital highlights the extreme inefficiency of the current R&D-heavy business model, where capital is consumed by certification milestones without a corresponding increase in productive assets. This trend suggests that unless the company can achieve a breakthrough in aircraft commercialization, the current trajectory of capital allocation will continue to erode the firm's intrinsic value.
As reported in financial filings, the cash conversion cycle has fluctuated wildly, reaching 87 days in 2026Q1, which suggests that the company's ability to manage its working capital is hampered by the integration of legacy hardware sales with the project-based nature of aerospace development.
The high variability in DSO and DIO metrics indicates that the company lacks a stable operational rhythm, likely due to the disparate nature of its two business units. Investors should monitor whether the company can stabilize these cycles, as the current inefficiency places additional strain on an already limited cash position.
Based on the most recent quarterly data, the current ratio has declined to 0.55, signaling that the company's ability to meet short-term obligations is increasingly compromised by the rapid depletion of cash reserves to fund ongoing aerospace engineering and certification activities.
The deterioration of the quick ratio to 0.34 suggests that the company is highly dependent on external financing to maintain its operations, leaving it with little margin for error in a high-rate environment. This liquidity profile warrants close monitoring, as it may necessitate further dilutive equity raises to bridge the gap until commercialization.
The most commonly misapplied metric for XTIA is the price-to-sales ratio, which obscures the fact that the company's revenue is derived from a legacy business that shares no operational or strategic overlap with its primary aerospace development program.
Using a standard P/S multiple to value this entity is misleading because it treats the legacy RTLS revenue as a proxy for future aircraft sales, which are currently non-existent. Analysts should instead utilize a sum-of-the-parts approach, valuing the legacy business on a cash-flow basis and the aerospace segment as a real-option, to avoid overstating the company's current fundamental strength.
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying XTIA stock.
XTI Aerospace, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -0.4x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
XTI Aerospace, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -371.5%. The historical average is -249.6%.
Based on historical data, XTI Aerospace, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -0.4x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
XTI Aerospace, Inc. has 21.9% gross margin and -182.2% operating margin.