Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -2.2x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE N/A. (2005–2024 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $4.6B | $4.0B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $4.5B | $4.1B | $7.6B | $7.9B | $10.3B | $7.4B | $7.0B |
| Enterprise Value | $9.5B | $8.8B | $6.9B | $6.4B | $6.9B | $6.1B | $8.4B | $9.0B | $11.0B | $7.8B | $7.2B |
| P/E Ratio → | -2.16 | — | — | — | — | — | 14.40 | 12.74 | 28.99 | 15.77 | 8.85 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.73 | 0.63 | 0.56 | 0.62 | 1.14 | 1.19 | 0.97 | 1.09 | 1.47 | 1.09 | 1.05 |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | — | 10.00 | 4.74 | 4.33 | 6.35 | 5.71 | 3.84 | 3.29 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 11.05 | 15.77 | 34.22 | 16.01 | 7.51 |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 8.27 | 10.22 | 17.93 | 10.34 | 5.41 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.40 | 1.14 | 1.27 | 1.74 | 1.80 | 1.06 | 1.24 | 1.58 | 1.15 | 1.08 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | 38.15 | 114.49 | — | — | 8.00 | 8.27 | 10.00 | 7.27 | 6.79 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | 11.08 | 10.75 | 19.11 | 10.87 | 8.31 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 12.11 | 18.02 | 36.64 | 16.85 | 7.70 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -21.7% | -21.7% | 3.4% | 1.0% | -3.0% | -12.0% | 13.7% | 15.1% | 16.1% | 16.4% | 16.9% |
| Operating Margin | -28.3% | -28.3% | -2.2% | -5.6% | -11.6% | -19.1% | 10.1% | 11.8% | 12.7% | 12.7% | 13.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | -33.9% | -33.9% | -10.2% | -10.8% | -13.7% | -25.6% | 6.7% | 8.5% | 5.1% | 6.9% | 11.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | — | -532.4% | -82.8% | -66.5% | 35.3% | 40.6% | 19.0% | 23.2% | 42.1% |
| ROA | -31.2% | -31.2% | -9.1% | -7.6% | -6.7% | -10.9% | 8.0% | 11.3% | 6.6% | 8.4% | 14.4% |
| ROIC | -50.9% | -50.9% | -3.3% | -7.1% | -11.9% | -18.0% | 24.5% | 26.2% | 27.5% | 28.1% | 27.8% |
| ROCE | -44.9% | -44.9% | -2.8% | -5.3% | -7.3% | -10.4% | 16.0% | 22.2% | 23.6% | 21.1% | 21.2% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | 8.64 | 4.60 | 1.75 | 1.53 | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.53 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | 24.02 | 70.88 | — | — | 2.95 | 1.74 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.08 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | 5.35 | 2.42 | 0.42 | 0.91 | 0.40 | 0.20 | 0.08 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | 19.48 | 59.10 | — | — | 0.70 | 1.03 | 0.66 | 0.36 | 0.17 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.06 | 2.25 | 2.42 | 0.84 | 0.19 |
| Interest Coverage | -5.05 | -5.05 | -0.42 | -1.15 | -1.89 | -3.34 | 8.63 | 10.69 | 21.28 | 15.07 | 16.57 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.71 | 1.62 | 2.03 | 2.62 | 2.64 | 1.76 | 1.64 | 1.88 | 2.26 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 1.29 | 1.79 | 2.00 | 1.13 | 0.74 | 0.90 | 1.05 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.79 | 1.10 | 1.34 | 0.48 | 0.26 | 0.45 | 0.66 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.93 | 0.87 | 0.75 | 0.51 | 0.41 | 1.03 | 1.27 | 1.33 | 1.26 | 1.15 |
| Inventory Turnover | 4.06 | 4.06 | 3.31 | 3.39 | 2.94 | 2.68 | 6.07 | 6.05 | 4.04 | 3.75 | 3.11 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 68.17 | 67.21 | 72.16 | 84.84 | 125.22 | 53.33 | 30.28 | 37.75 | 35.49 | 29.50 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 0.5% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | 9.5% | 7.8% | 13.3% | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 6.9% | 7.9% | 3.4% | 6.3% | 11.3% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 9.0% | 6.3% | 2.9% | 6.2% | 13.3% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 10.2% | 4.8% | 8.8% | 4.3% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.4% | 1.7% | 10.9% | 5.3% | 8.8% | 4.3% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $117M | $107M | $105M | $104M | $104M | $105M | $109M | $118M | $127M | $139M |
Operational production rate volatility
According to recent market data, Spirit AeroSystems trades at a price-to-sales multiple of 0.73, a valuation that appears to discount the company's standalone earnings potential in favor of its strategic importance as a captive supplier within the broader Boeing aerospace manufacturing ecosystem.
The negative trailing P/E ratio of -2.16 renders traditional earnings-based valuation metrics largely irrelevant, suggesting that investors are currently pricing the firm based on asset liquidation or acquisition scenarios. The forward P/E of 31.52 implies a market expectation of a return to profitability, though this appears highly contingent on successful integration or restructuring rather than organic operational improvement.
Based on reported figures, the company's ROIC has deteriorated significantly to -51.6% in 2025Q3, illustrating a profound inability to generate returns on invested capital as the firm struggles with persistent operational inefficiencies and the heavy burden of legacy fixed-price contract losses.
The collapse in ROIC from positive territory in 2023Q4 to deep negative levels suggests that the capital deployed into the Wichita production footprint is currently value-destructive. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the company's asset base can ever achieve adequate returns without a fundamental shift in its pricing power or cost structure.
As reported in quarterly filings, the cash conversion cycle has ballooned to 228 days in 2025Q3, driven by an inefficient inventory turnover process that highlights the company's struggle to manage production flow amidst ongoing quality-related delays and out-of-sequence assembly requirements.
The elevated days sales outstanding and days inventory outstanding suggest that Spirit is effectively financing its customers' production schedules at the expense of its own liquidity. This inefficiency appears structural, as the company remains tethered to the specific, complex logistics of the 737 fuselage program.
According to the latest balance sheet data, the current ratio has compressed to 0.68, indicating that the firm's short-term assets are increasingly insufficient to cover immediate liabilities, a trend that underscores the company's reliance on external support to maintain ongoing operations.
The quick ratio of 0.46 further highlights the company's dependence on inventory liquidation to meet obligations, which is particularly risky given the potential for future write-downs on work-in-process. Investors should monitor this liquidity profile closely, as it leaves little room for error in the event of further production pauses.
The most commonly misapplied metric for Spirit AeroSystems is the EV/EBITDA multiple, which obscures the reality that the company functions more as a captive utility for its primary OEM customer than as a traditional, independent industrial manufacturer with discretionary pricing power.
Using standard industrial valuation multiples fails to account for the 'reach-forward' loss accounting that artificially depresses EBITDA, potentially leading analysts to underestimate the firm's strategic value. A more appropriate approach would involve analyzing the company's cash-burn rate relative to its strategic importance to the aerospace supply chain.
Includes 30+ ratios · 20 years · Updated daily
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
See how regular investing compounds over time.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SPR stock.
Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -2.2x. The historical average is 19.4x.
Based on historical data, Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -2.2x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc. has -21.7% gross margin and -28.3% operating margin.