Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -5.5x · EV/EBITDA 11.6x · ROE N/A. (1998–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $132M | $77M | $86M | $197M | $88M | $259M | $275M | $428M | $347M | $733M | $759M |
| Enterprise Value | $626M | $571M | $641M | $785M | $697M | $909M | $950M | $1.1B | $531M | $992M | $1.1B |
| P/E Ratio → | -5.46 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 24.42 | 64.83 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.26 | 0.53 | 0.59 |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | — | 49.41 | 3.36 | 2.28 | 1.19 | 0.91 | 1.89 | 2.18 |
| P/FCF | 21.25 | 12.32 | — | — | — | 51.45 | — | 706.12 | 4.56 | 10.03 | — |
| P/OCF | 3.57 | 2.07 | 12.26 | — | 2.49 | 5.47 | 13.60 | 7.39 | 2.75 | 4.68 | 7.67 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.47 | 0.51 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.78 | 1.09 | 0.85 | 0.40 | 0.72 | 0.84 |
| EV / EBITDA | 11.62 | 10.59 | 137.88 | 11.09 | 37.16 | 19.63 | — | 14.15 | 6.25 | 7.54 | 11.14 |
| EV / EBIT | 224.46 | 194.76 | — | 139.07 | — | — | — | — | — | 21.59 | 91.02 |
| EV / FCF | — | 91.69 | — | — | — | 180.68 | — | 1836.42 | 6.98 | 13.57 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 68.0% | 68.0% | 68.3% | 32.1% | 33.2% | 33.9% | 27.4% | 33.7% | 34.0% | 34.2% | 34.8% |
| Operating Margin | 0.2% | 0.2% | -4.3% | 0.3% | -4.5% | -3.2% | -31.7% | -1.0% | -0.8% | 2.8% | 0.9% |
| Net Profit Margin | -1.9% | -1.9% | -6.2% | -1.6% | -6.2% | -4.3% | -31.8% | -0.6% | -0.5% | 2.2% | 0.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | — | — | -200.3% | -51.0% | -114.7% | -2.1% | -1.7% | 8.2% | 3.2% |
| ROA | -3.9% | -3.9% | -11.2% | -2.7% | -9.0% | -5.3% | -25.0% | -0.8% | -0.7% | 3.3% | 1.3% |
| ROIC | 0.5% | 0.5% | -7.7% | 0.6% | -6.4% | -3.7% | -22.4% | -1.2% | -1.3% | 4.4% | 1.4% |
| ROCE | 0.7% | 0.7% | -10.5% | 0.8% | -8.7% | -5.0% | -30.3% | -1.5% | -1.5% | 5.1% | 1.6% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | 367.32 | 8.74 | 5.73 | 1.98 | 0.53 | 0.71 | 1.00 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 9.53 | 9.53 | 125.89 | 8.64 | 35.05 | 14.53 | — | 9.09 | 2.39 | 2.10 | 3.53 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | 340.03 | 8.45 | 5.59 | 1.90 | 0.48 | 0.67 | 0.96 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 9.16 | 9.16 | 119.29 | 8.30 | 32.45 | 14.04 | — | 8.71 | 2.17 | 1.97 | 3.41 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 79.37 | — | — | — | 129.23 | — | 1130.30 | 2.42 | 3.54 | — |
| Interest Coverage | 0.11 | 0.11 | -2.07 | 0.21 | -2.79 | -2.57 | -26.90 | -1.18 | -0.96 | 4.19 | 1.66 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.54 | 0.46 | 0.43 | 0.54 | 0.58 | 0.65 | 0.66 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.38 | 0.35 | 0.42 | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.47 | 0.45 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.22 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.08 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 2.15 | 1.95 | 1.76 | 1.52 | 1.25 | 0.89 | 1.06 | 1.59 | 1.52 | 1.41 |
| Inventory Turnover | 15.07 | 15.07 | 14.80 | 32.98 | 31.99 | 30.42 | 26.50 | 33.00 | 32.29 | 30.74 | 28.26 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 5.86 | 5.76 | 6.05 | 6.34 | 11.70 | 13.94 | 6.21 | 6.83 | 7.00 | 6.80 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 4.1% | 1.5% |
| FCF Yield | 4.7% | 8.1% | — | — | — | 1.9% | — | 0.1% | 21.9% | 10.0% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.0% | 5.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 6.1% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.0% | 5.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 6.1% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $18M | $16M | $16M | $16M | $16M | $14M | $13M | $13M | $13M | $13M |
Liquidity and solvency risk
According to current market data, RRGB trades at a price-to-sales multiple of 0.11, which suggests that investors are heavily discounting the company's future revenue potential compared to peers like BJRI, reflecting deep skepticism regarding the viability of the current North Star turnaround strategy in a saturated market.
The negative TTM P/E ratio of -5.72 confirms that the company is currently unable to generate consistent earnings, rendering traditional earnings-based valuation metrics largely irrelevant for assessing intrinsic value. The market's pricing appears to be focused on survival rather than growth, as the forward EV/EBITDA of 17.17 implies that investors expect significant operational challenges to persist well into the future.
Based on reported financial figures, RRGB's ROIC has struggled to maintain positive territory, frequently dipping into negative values such as -5.1% in 2024Q4, which indicates that the company is currently destroying shareholder capital rather than compounding it through its core restaurant operations.
The inability to generate a return on invested capital that exceeds the cost of capital suggests that the company's large-format, high-labor restaurant model is fundamentally misaligned with current consumer demand. This persistent decay in returns warrants further investigation into whether the existing asset base can ever achieve the efficiency levels required to justify its current carrying value.
As reported in recent quarterly filings, the company's cash conversion cycle remains tight, with a CCC of 3 days in 2026Q1, indicating that while the firm manages its payables and inventory aggressively, it lacks the operational buffer to absorb even minor disruptions in the supply chain.
The low asset turnover ratio, which has hovered around 0.4x to 0.6x, highlights the inefficiency of the company's physical footprint relative to its revenue generation. This suggests that the firm is carrying significant excess capacity that fails to contribute to top-line growth, thereby pressuring overall margins and limiting the effectiveness of working capital management.
According to recent balance sheet data, the company maintains a current ratio of 0.47, which, when combined with a minimal cash position, suggests that RRGB is highly vulnerable to any sudden contraction in credit availability or unexpected spikes in commodity costs like ground beef.
The quick ratio of 0.33 further underscores the lack of liquid assets available to cover immediate obligations, leaving the company with little room for error. Investors should monitor the company's ability to refinance its debt, as the current liquidity profile appears insufficient to support a prolonged period of negative cash flow.
The most commonly misapplied metric for RRGB is EBITDA, which frequently obscures the company's massive lease obligations and the high capital intensity required to maintain its aging restaurant portfolio, leading to an overly optimistic view of the firm's actual cash-generating capacity.
Because the company relies heavily on leased assets, EBITDA fails to account for the significant rent expenses that are essential to the business model, thereby inflating the perceived profitability of the firm. Analysts should instead focus on free cash flow after lease payments to gain a more accurate understanding of the company's true financial health and its ability to sustain operations without further dilutive financing.
Includes 30+ ratios · 28 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RRGB stock.
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -5.5x. The historical average is 27.7x.
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 11.6x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 10.9x.
Based on historical data, Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -5.5x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc. has 68.0% gross margin and 0.2% operating margin.
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 9.5x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.