Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.0x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -373.6%. (2020–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $2M | $24M | $141M | $52M | $114M | $1.3B | — |
| Enterprise Value | $7M | $29M | $119M | $49M | $79M | $1.0B | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.04 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 1.67 | 18.21 | 768.80 | 32.25 | — | 217941.78 | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.37 | 3.50 | 6.08 | 0.66 | 0.65 | 5.22 | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 22.00 | 650.72 | 30.66 | — | 171979.78 | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | -1575.1% | -1575.1% | -1911.5% | -464.1% | — | -16483.3% | -66.8% |
| Operating Margin | -6298.7% | -6298.7% | -43239.9% | -7456.0% | — | -8591600.0% | -17551.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -4302.8% | -4302.8% | -61067.8% | -7102.5% | — | -8422166.7% | -17352.6% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -373.6% | -373.6% | -220.9% | -90.1% | -50.5% | -341.2% | -147.1% |
| ROA | -66.3% | -66.3% | -83.3% | -64.7% | -42.3% | -295.6% | -137.4% |
| ROIC | -929.5% | -929.5% | -154.1% | -83.4% | -167.4% | — | — |
| ROCE | -136.6% | -136.6% | -80.4% | -80.5% | -54.8% | -324.0% | -148.7% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 2.84 | 2.84 | 2.19 | 0.50 | 0.12 | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.73 | -0.93 | -0.03 | -0.20 | -1.10 | -0.98 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | -85.19 | -85.19 | -117.71 | — | -2.53 | — | -22699.33 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.18 | 1.18 | 2.28 | 2.66 | 8.27 | 14.01 | 14.84 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.18 | 1.18 | 2.20 | 2.64 | 8.27 | 14.01 | 14.75 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.12 | 1.12 | 2.00 | 2.43 | 7.67 | 13.42 | 14.36 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.01 | — | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | 1.20 | 19.59 | — | — | 2.39 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 22.51 | 3081.56 | 478.72 | — | 77684.17 | 245.53 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $32M | $16M | $10M | $10M | $8M | $8M |
Imminent liquidity exhaustion risk
As reported in recent financial filings, REE trades at a price-to-sales multiple of 4.46, a valuation that appears disconnected from its current pre-revenue status and suggests investors are pricing in a high-probability pivot to successful commercial licensing rather than near-term vehicle manufacturing profitability.
The lack of meaningful P/E or EV/EBITDA metrics highlights the company's current status as a speculative technology play rather than a traditional industrial manufacturer. Investors should monitor whether this premium valuation can be sustained as the company faces the reality of scaling production in a capital-constrained environment.
Based on the company's reported figures, the ROIC has plummeted to -147.6% in 2025Q2, illustrating a severe decay in capital efficiency as the firm continues to absorb heavy R&D costs without achieving the necessary production volume to generate positive returns on its invested capital base.
The persistent negative ROIC suggests that the current business model is destroying shareholder value rather than compounding it. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the 'asset-light' strategy is truly efficient or if it merely delays the inevitable capital requirements of full-scale automotive manufacturing.
According to recent quarterly data, the company's cash conversion cycle remains highly erratic, with DSO figures reaching extreme levels that suggest significant friction in converting prototype deliveries into actual cash inflows from commercial fleet customers in the North American market.
The inability to stabilize the cash conversion cycle reflects the inherent challenges of a pre-scale industrial firm managing complex supply chains. This inefficiency appears to be a structural hurdle that will likely persist until the company achieves consistent, high-volume production cycles.
As indicated by the latest financial statements, the debt-to-equity ratio has climbed to 1.06, marking a sharp departure from the 0.12 level observed in 2022Q4 and signaling an increasing reliance on debt to bridge the gap between operational cash burn and revenue generation.
While the absolute debt levels remain manageable, the rapid increase in leverage in a high-interest-rate environment suggests a tightening financial position. Investors should monitor the company's ability to service this debt without resorting to further dilutive equity financing.
The most commonly misapplied metric for REE is the traditional P/E ratio, which obscures the company's true economic reality by focusing on earnings that are currently non-existent due to the heavy, front-loaded R&D costs required for its proprietary by-wire technology.
Using P/E or even standard EV/EBITDA multiples for a pre-revenue firm like REE is fundamentally flawed as it ignores the massive R&D-to-COGS distortion. Analysts should instead focus on cash burn rates and the conversion of non-binding indications of interest into firm, cash-backed orders to assess the company's actual viability.
Includes 30+ ratios · 6 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying REE stock.
REE Automotive Ltd.'s current P/E ratio is -0.0x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
REE Automotive Ltd.'s return on equity (ROE) is -373.6%. The historical average is -203.9%.
Based on historical data, REE Automotive Ltd. is trading at a P/E of -0.0x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
REE Automotive Ltd. has -1575.1% gross margin and -6298.7% operating margin.