Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -14.4x · EV/EBITDA 61.5x · ROE N/A. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $203M | $263M | $190M | $313M | $437M | $520M | $473M | $617M | $638M | $535M | $444M |
| Enterprise Value | $554M | $613M | $568M | $716M | $846M | $924M | $971M | $1.1B | $788M | $652M | $569M |
| P/E Ratio → | -14.44 | — | — | — | — | 16.35 | — | — | 44.37 | 17.29 | 47.20 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.00 | 1.29 | 0.90 | 1.40 | 2.15 | 3.74 | 6.08 | 2.23 | 2.06 | 1.91 | 1.64 |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | 9.48 | 6.91 | 4.95 | 5.83 | 4.42 | 3.54 | 2.95 | 3.03 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 25.08 | 19.56 | 22.42 | 14.71 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 3.02 | 2.70 | 3.22 | 4.16 | 6.65 | 12.47 | 3.84 | 2.55 | 2.33 | 2.10 |
| EV / EBITDA | 61.49 | 68.10 | 181.68 | 86.66 | — | 212.00 | — | 32.35 | 16.59 | 17.37 | 15.05 |
| EV / EBIT | — | 148.44 | — | — | — | 16.97 | — | 103.72 | 32.43 | 16.01 | 28.99 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 13.4% | 13.4% | 10.4% | 11.9% | 7.6% | 4.4% | -28.0% | 20.7% | 23.8% | 22.5% | 23.3% |
| Operating Margin | -2.6% | -2.6% | -6.7% | -5.4% | -14.0% | -30.1% | -78.7% | 3.3% | 7.8% | 7.4% | 7.5% |
| Net Profit Margin | -7.0% | -7.0% | -16.8% | -13.8% | -17.8% | 23.0% | -83.7% | -9.5% | 4.6% | 11.1% | 3.5% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | -250.3% | -63.7% | -43.0% | 34.3% | -59.1% | -16.5% | 7.9% | 18.9% | 6.6% |
| ROA | -3.1% | -3.1% | -6.7% | -5.0% | -5.4% | 4.6% | -9.6% | -4.7% | 3.3% | 7.5% | 2.4% |
| ROIC | -1.1% | -1.1% | -2.6% | -2.0% | -4.4% | -5.8% | -7.9% | 1.5% | 5.7% | 5.4% | 5.9% |
| ROCE | -1.7% | -1.7% | -3.7% | -2.5% | -5.2% | -7.3% | -10.8% | 2.0% | 6.9% | 6.0% | 6.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | 12.69 | 7.01 | 4.64 | 6.46 | 3.27 | 0.90 | 0.72 | 0.98 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 40.09 | 40.09 | 124.75 | 50.67 | — | 111.74 | — | 13.92 | 3.43 | 3.48 | 3.80 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | 12.22 | 6.46 | 3.84 | 6.13 | 3.19 | 0.83 | 0.64 | 0.85 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 38.92 | 38.92 | 120.80 | 48.80 | — | 92.64 | — | 13.55 | 3.15 | 3.12 | 3.30 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | 0.23 | 0.23 | -0.67 | -0.58 | -1.49 | 3.98 | -6.57 | 1.30 | 3.55 | 6.57 | 2.86 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.39 | 0.94 | 0.47 | 0.24 | 0.35 | 0.42 | 1.10 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.38 | 0.92 | 0.46 | 0.23 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 1.08 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.29 | 0.78 | 0.22 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.29 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.32 | 0.20 | 0.11 | 0.41 | 0.70 | 0.66 | 0.67 |
| Inventory Turnover | 105.64 | 105.64 | 111.94 | 119.04 | 116.16 | 94.47 | 94.09 | 131.12 | 166.10 | 151.46 | 149.22 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 8.19 | 9.15 | 12.39 | 11.17 | 14.07 | 37.55 | 9.34 | 9.49 | 17.03 | 11.84 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 6.1% | — | — | 2.3% | 5.8% | 2.1% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 1.8% | 0.4% | 1.2% | 0.6% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 1.8% | 0.4% | 1.2% | 0.6% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $23M | $22M | $22M | $22M | $22M | $22M | $23M | $23M | $23M | $24M |
Liquidity and insolvency risk
According to recent market data, RDIB trades at an EV/EBITDA multiple of 61.70, a figure that appears disconnected from fundamental performance and suggests the market is pricing the company as a distressed asset rather than a traditional entertainment entity with sustainable cash flow generation capabilities.
The absence of a meaningful P/E ratio and the elevated EV/EBITDA multiple indicate that investors are struggling to find a valuation floor amidst persistent operating losses. This valuation gap compared to peers like Cinemark suggests that the market may be discounting the company's cinema operations entirely while remaining skeptical of the realizable value of its real estate holdings.
As reported in financial statements, the company's ROIC has consistently languished in negative territory, reaching -0.8% in 2026Q1, which demonstrates a fundamental inability to generate returns on invested capital that exceed the cost of maintaining its extensive, yet underperforming, theater and real estate asset base.
The persistent negative ROIC suggests that the company is effectively destroying shareholder value with every dollar of capital deployed into its current operations. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the company's capital allocation strategy is fundamentally flawed or if the asset-heavy nature of the business model is simply incompatible with current industry revenue levels.
Based on reported figures, the company's asset turnover ratio remains exceptionally low at 0.10, which highlights a significant lack of operational efficiency in converting its substantial property and equipment base into meaningful revenue compared to industry standards for cinema and entertainment operators.
The negative cash conversion cycle, while appearing to provide a source of cash, likely reflects an aggressive stretching of payables rather than operational excellence. This reliance on supplier leverage to manage working capital suggests a precarious liquidity position that may become unsustainable if vendor terms are tightened in response to the company's ongoing financial distress.
According to recent quarterly filings, the company's current ratio has deteriorated to 0.34, a level that indicates a severe lack of liquid assets to cover short-term obligations and leaves the firm highly vulnerable to any unexpected operational shocks or further declines in theater attendance.
The quick ratio of 0.33 confirms that the company is almost entirely dependent on its ability to generate immediate cash from operations or asset sales to meet its liabilities. This liquidity profile appears inadequate for a business with such high fixed costs, suggesting that the company may face significant refinancing or insolvency risks in the near term.
Investors frequently misapply P/E and EBITDA-based valuation multiples to RDIB, which obscures the company's true nature as a real estate holding entity and fails to account for the significant non-cash depreciation charges that distort the reported profitability of its cinema operations.
Using earnings-based metrics for a company with negative operating margins and significant real estate assets is fundamentally flawed, as it ignores the potential for asset liquidation or redevelopment value. A more appropriate approach would involve a Net Asset Value (NAV) analysis, which would better capture the underlying worth of the company's fee-simple property holdings rather than its struggling theatrical business.
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RDIB stock.
Reading International, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -14.4x. The historical average is 31.9x.
Reading International, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 61.5x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 23.6x.
Based on historical data, Reading International, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -14.4x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Reading International, Inc. has 13.4% gross margin and -2.6% operating margin.
Reading International, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 40.1x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.