Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -7.7x · EV/EBITDA 9.2x · ROE -41.1%. (2009–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $373M | $674M | $1.1B | $2.4B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.4B |
| Enterprise Value | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $5.2B | $4.7B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.6B |
| P/E Ratio → | -7.66 | — | 18.19 | 18.59 | 14.91 | 15.98 | — | 15.02 | 17.56 | 16.55 | 25.93 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.18 | 0.32 | 0.50 | 1.07 | 1.04 | 1.33 | 3.39 | 1.11 | 1.63 | 1.76 | 2.35 |
| P/B Ratio | 4.08 | 7.39 | 7.29 | 9.39 | 4.98 | 6.31 | 9.67 | 8.88 | 5.30 | 4.75 | 5.36 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | 69.38 | 9.73 | 9.11 | — | 24.74 | 16.95 | 44.70 | 46.45 |
| P/OCF | 1.28 | 2.32 | 3.40 | 6.48 | 4.60 | 6.14 | — | 5.21 | 6.09 | 7.56 | 10.19 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.82 | 1.97 | 2.37 | 2.41 | 2.66 | 7.74 | 2.51 | 1.92 | 2.06 | 2.59 |
| EV / EBITDA | 9.16 | 9.94 | 9.15 | 10.17 | 10.59 | 10.40 | — | 12.11 | 8.70 | 8.75 | 10.89 |
| EV / EBIT | 33.51 | 49.13 | 20.44 | 18.48 | 18.68 | 19.55 | — | 23.04 | 15.16 | 14.30 | 17.35 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | 154.01 | 22.48 | 18.16 | — | 55.81 | 20.02 | 52.46 | 51.26 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 85.7% | 85.7% | 85.3% | 32.8% | 83.5% | 84.3% | 82.8% | 82.8% | 82.6% | 82.7% | 82.1% |
| Operating Margin | 5.0% | 5.0% | 10.3% | 13.9% | 14.1% | 15.0% | -57.9% | 10.9% | 12.7% | 14.5% | 15.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -2.3% | -2.3% | 2.7% | 5.8% | 7.0% | 8.3% | -47.4% | 7.4% | 9.3% | 10.6% | 9.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -41.1% | -41.1% | 29.4% | 38.4% | 40.0% | 50.7% | -128.2% | 36.0% | 29.0% | 28.1% | 23.1% |
| ROA | -1.2% | -1.2% | 1.5% | 3.4% | 4.5% | 4.6% | -8.8% | 5.5% | 9.5% | 10.8% | 8.8% |
| ROIC | 2.4% | 2.4% | 5.2% | 7.4% | 8.2% | 7.2% | -9.2% | 7.9% | 15.8% | 17.1% | 16.8% |
| ROCE | 2.9% | 2.9% | 6.4% | 9.2% | 10.3% | 9.5% | -12.1% | 9.5% | 16.0% | 17.8% | 17.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 34.71 | 34.71 | 21.53 | 11.60 | 6.97 | 6.37 | 12.47 | 11.29 | 1.01 | 0.87 | 0.60 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 8.23 | 8.23 | 6.84 | 5.66 | 6.41 | 5.26 | — | 6.83 | 1.41 | 1.36 | 1.11 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 34.52 | 21.48 | 11.45 | 6.53 | 6.27 | 12.39 | 11.14 | 0.96 | 0.82 | 0.56 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 8.19 | 8.19 | 6.83 | 5.59 | 6.01 | 5.18 | — | 6.74 | 1.33 | 1.29 | 1.02 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | 84.63 | 12.75 | 9.05 | — | 31.07 | 3.07 | 7.76 | 4.81 |
| Interest Coverage | 0.53 | 0.53 | 1.51 | 2.15 | 3.02 | 3.57 | -6.93 | 7.04 | 12.21 | 18.99 | 21.10 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.27 | 0.37 | 0.46 | 0.43 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.23 | 0.57 | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.30 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.41 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.11 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.59 | 0.52 | 0.56 | 0.19 | 0.57 | 0.99 | 0.95 | 0.95 |
| Inventory Turnover | 7.53 | 7.53 | 7.90 | 39.82 | 7.12 | 5.08 | 3.15 | 6.77 | 8.06 | 7.14 | 8.25 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 9.46 | 5.00 | 7.41 | 8.77 | 18.17 | 58.59 | 2.34 | 3.64 | 6.34 | 2.14 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.3% | 1.0% | 0.6% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 15.7% | 9.9% | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 5.5% | 5.4% | 6.7% | 6.3% | — | 6.7% | 5.7% | 6.0% | 3.9% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | 1.4% | 10.3% | 11.0% | — | 4.0% | 5.9% | 2.2% | 2.2% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.5% | 0.3% | 16.3% | 12.8% | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 19.8% | 7.3% | 7.6% | 1.2% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.5% | 0.3% | 16.3% | 12.8% | 1.6% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 20.8% | 7.8% | 7.6% | 1.2% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $35M | $40M | $44M | $49M | $49M | $44M | $34M | $40M | $43M | $43M |
Fixed cost deleveraging risk
As reported in recent financial filings, PLAY's forward P/E of 93.59 suggests that the market is pricing in a significant recovery, yet the negative TTM P/E of -8.44 highlights the current disconnect between depressed earnings and the company's high-fixed-cost, capital-intensive operating model.
The extreme forward P/E multiple indicates that investors are banking on a sharp rebound in profitability that remains unproven by recent quarterly trends. Compared to peers like Texas Roadhouse, the current valuation appears to be pricing in a cyclical turnaround that may be overly optimistic given the persistent revenue contraction.
Based on the company's reported figures, ROIC has trended downward from 2.2% in 2023Q4 to a marginal 1.3% in 2026Q1, indicating that the firm is struggling to generate returns on its massive asset base that exceed the likely cost of its debt-heavy capital structure.
The consistent decay in ROIC suggests that recent capital allocation, including the Main Event acquisition, has not yet yielded the expected synergistic returns. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the company's large-format real estate strategy is becoming a structural drag on long-term value creation.
According to recent quarterly data, the cash conversion cycle has remained deeply negative, fluctuating between -9 and -86 days, which suggests that the company's ability to collect cash upfront via the Power Card ecosystem is currently being offset by high inventory and labor-related payables.
While a negative cash conversion cycle is typically a sign of efficiency, in PLAY's case, it appears to be a byproduct of the deferred revenue model rather than superior operational speed. Investors should monitor whether the widening gap in DPO indicates an attempt to preserve cash at the expense of supplier relationships.
As reported in financial statements, the debt-to-EBITDA ratio has spiked to 40.42 in 2025Q4, a level that appears highly precarious when compared to the company's historical leverage profile and the broader entertainment sector's typical debt-servicing capacity.
The volatility in interest coverage, which has dipped into negative territory, suggests that the company's ability to service its debt is increasingly dependent on non-operating cash flows. This level of leverage leaves little room for error should the current revenue contraction persist into the next fiscal year.
Market participants frequently misapply standard restaurant P/E multiples to PLAY, which obscures the reality that the business is a high-margin digital gaming venue rather than a traditional food service provider, leading to a fundamental misunderstanding of its true earnings quality and cyclical sensitivity.
By ignoring the structural difference between amusement-driven revenue and food-driven revenue, analysts often overlook the high-margin 'breakage' and deferred revenue components that define PLAY's unique economics. A more appropriate metric would be an adjusted EV/EBITDA that accounts for the specific capital intensity of the arcade floor versus the kitchen.
Includes 30+ ratios · 17 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying PLAY stock.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -7.7x. The historical average is 30.6x.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 9.2x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 10.0x.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -41.1%. The historical average is 7.5%.
Based on historical data, Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -7.7x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc. has 85.7% gross margin and 5.0% operating margin.
Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 8.2x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.