Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.0x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -112.9%. (2004–2024 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $2M | $235M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $1.5B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $1.7B | $1.1B |
| Enterprise Value | $95M | $328M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.3B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $1.4B | $886M |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.01 | — | — | — | 61.00 | 15.62 | 17.05 | 27.28 | 43.33 | 39.49 | 24.08 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.00 | 0.35 | 1.20 | 1.11 | 1.19 | 1.61 | 1.20 | 2.20 | 2.49 | 2.50 | 1.73 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.03 | 3.84 | 5.45 | 2.75 | 2.59 | 2.86 | 2.23 | 4.48 | 4.69 | 4.25 | 2.55 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 11.46 | 15.36 | 61.08 | 41.65 | 15.66 | 61.46 |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | 9.90 | 11.19 | 33.46 | 28.90 | 14.20 | 39.90 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.48 | 1.26 | 1.04 | 1.09 | 1.34 | 1.05 | 2.08 | 2.35 | 2.18 | 1.44 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 52.89 | 10.61 | 10.32 | 15.93 | 21.15 | 20.22 | 11.70 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | 13.13 | 14.75 | 21.43 | 28.57 | 25.00 | 14.07 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | 9.59 | 13.49 | 57.76 | 39.22 | 13.63 | 51.09 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 20.9% | 20.9% | 22.0% | 29.6% | 35.2% | 46.9% | 44.8% | 50.8% | 49.0% | 48.3% | 46.8% |
| Operating Margin | -15.1% | -15.1% | -29.7% | -20.3% | -0.1% | 10.2% | 7.1% | 9.7% | 8.2% | 8.7% | 9.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | -21.3% | -21.3% | -34.2% | -24.2% | 1.9% | 10.3% | 7.0% | 8.1% | 5.8% | 6.3% | 7.2% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -112.9% | -112.9% | -90.7% | -48.0% | 4.0% | 20.2% | 14.4% | 17.5% | 11.9% | 10.4% | 10.9% |
| ROA | -23.3% | -23.3% | -38.8% | -28.3% | 2.6% | 13.9% | 10.1% | 12.1% | 8.5% | 8.1% | 8.7% |
| ROIC | -38.6% | -38.6% | -61.7% | -37.5% | -0.2% | 24.3% | 14.8% | 21.3% | 21.1% | 21.0% | 20.6% |
| ROCE | -27.7% | -27.7% | -53.6% | -36.2% | -0.1% | 18.3% | 13.6% | 20.2% | 16.4% | 14.0% | 14.8% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 3.71 | 3.71 | 1.19 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.09 | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 1.54 | 0.31 | 0.50 | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.52 | 0.25 | -0.17 | -0.21 | -0.47 | -0.27 | -0.24 | -0.27 | -0.55 | -0.43 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | -4.71 | -2.08 | -1.44 | -0.92 | -1.31 | -3.01 | -2.38 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | -1.87 | -1.88 | -3.32 | -2.43 | -2.03 | -10.38 |
| Interest Coverage | -4.66 | -4.66 | — | -128.20 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.32 | 1.32 | 1.62 | 1.78 | 2.00 | 2.87 | 2.93 | 2.41 | 2.20 | 3.41 | 4.03 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.97 | 0.97 | 1.09 | 0.82 | 1.15 | 2.27 | 2.16 | 1.64 | 1.66 | 2.96 | 3.39 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.62 | 0.62 | 0.64 | 0.40 | 0.59 | 1.57 | 1.27 | 0.76 | 0.84 | 2.26 | 2.20 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.32 | 1.21 | 1.42 | 1.32 | 1.20 | 1.32 | 1.42 | 1.28 | 1.30 | 1.18 |
| Inventory Turnover | 7.10 | 7.10 | 4.55 | 2.92 | 3.04 | 4.18 | 4.26 | 3.26 | 4.22 | 6.75 | 5.32 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 26.69 | 32.54 | 20.36 | 37.47 | 43.51 | 43.94 | 54.17 | 58.98 | 40.36 | 62.22 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 1.6% | 6.4% | 5.9% | 3.7% | 2.3% | 2.5% | 4.2% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 8.7% | 6.5% | 1.6% | 2.4% | 6.4% | 1.6% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 8.1% | 1.1% | 0.0% | 2.1% | 0.1% | 5.9% | 3.5% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 8.1% | 1.1% | 0.0% | 2.1% | 0.1% | 5.9% | 3.5% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $30M | $28M | $27M | $28M | $29M | $29M | $29M | $29M | $28M | $30M |
Insolvency and liquidity risk
As reported in recent financial statements, iRobot's gross margin has experienced extreme volatility, swinging from a low of 9.5% in 2024Q4 to 31.0% in 2025Q3, which highlights the company's ongoing struggle to maintain premium pricing power against lower-cost, feature-parity competitors in the floor care market.
The erratic nature of these margins suggests that the company is frequently forced into aggressive promotional discounting to move inventory, undermining its historical identity as a premium technology provider. Investors should monitor whether the recent recovery in gross margin is sustainable or merely a temporary byproduct of aggressive cost-cutting and inventory liquidation.
Based on the company's reported figures, ROIC has deteriorated sharply from a positive 3.6% in 2024Q1 to a deeply negative -7.6% in 2025Q3, indicating that the firm is currently destroying shareholder value rather than compounding it through its core operational activities.
This decay in return on capital is a direct consequence of the company's inability to generate sufficient operating income to cover its asset base. The negative trend suggests that the current business model is failing to achieve the scale necessary to justify the capital intensity required for R&D and manufacturing.
According to quarterly data, the cash conversion cycle has remained highly erratic, reaching -62 days in 2025Q3, which, while appearing efficient, likely masks significant underlying stress in inventory management and supplier relationships as the company attempts to preserve cash in a declining revenue environment.
The extreme fluctuations in days inventory outstanding, which peaked at 511 days in 2025Q3, suggest that the company is struggling to align production with actual consumer demand. This inefficiency forces the firm to rely on extended payment terms with suppliers, which may not be sustainable if credit conditions tighten.
As evidenced by the company's balance sheet, the current ratio has compressed to 0.52 in 2025Q3, down from 1.79 in 2024Q1, signaling that the firm's ability to meet short-term obligations is increasingly compromised as cash reserves dwindle and current liabilities remain elevated.
The quick ratio of 0.22 further underscores the lack of liquid assets available to cover immediate debts, leaving the company highly vulnerable to any further operational shocks. This liquidity position warrants close monitoring, as it suggests the firm may soon face significant challenges in funding its ongoing operations.
Market participants often misapply price-to-sales multiples to iRobot, which obscures the company's fundamental inability to convert revenue into cash flow, thereby ignoring the critical reality that the firm's hardware-centric model is currently failing to generate the margins necessary for long-term viability.
Instead of relying on P/S, analysts should focus on the cash burn rate and the sustainability of the current capital structure. Using revenue multiples in a distressed turnaround scenario provides a false sense of security, as it fails to account for the structural erosion of the company's competitive moat.
Includes 30+ ratios · 21 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying IRBT stock.
iRobot Corporation's current P/E ratio is -0.0x. The historical average is 45.6x.
iRobot Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is -112.9%. The historical average is -3.8%.
Based on historical data, iRobot Corporation is trading at a P/E of -0.0x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
iRobot Corporation has 20.9% gross margin and -15.1% operating margin.