Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -2.3x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -374.7%. (2011–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $46M | $135M | $492M | $543M | $1.5B | $4.5B | $176M | $295M | $360M | $381M | $153M |
| Enterprise Value | $66M | $155M | $507M | $558M | $1.5B | $4.5B | $188M | $304M | $363M | $382M | $153M |
| P/E Ratio → | -2.28 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 2.31 | 6.81 | 12.52 | 13.69 | 86.95 | 339.18 | 12.21 | 48.43 | 102.33 | — | 14327.83 |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | 42.49 | 19.63 | 43.59 | 124.65 | — | — | 202.84 | 175.18 | 74.79 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 7.80 | 12.91 | 14.05 | 87.24 | 338.13 | 13.04 | 50.06 | 103.23 | — | 14274.20 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 11.1% | 11.1% | 13.6% | 18.3% | 22.5% | 26.9% | 28.2% | 30.5% | 35.5% | — | -862.3% |
| Operating Margin | -90.3% | -90.3% | -42.8% | -33.5% | -82.3% | -58.6% | -34.2% | -73.4% | -95.4% | — | -16088.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | -94.0% | -94.0% | -46.7% | -37.9% | -87.1% | -59.0% | -35.7% | -74.7% | -78.9% | — | -16266.5% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -374.7% | -374.7% | -93.5% | -48.5% | -42.6% | -44.8% | — | -538.3% | -140.4% | -133.1% | -94.0% |
| ROA | -46.5% | -46.5% | -33.7% | -26.6% | -33.6% | -29.7% | -41.0% | -46.8% | -46.2% | -66.4% | -55.1% |
| ROIC | -59.5% | -59.5% | -36.3% | -24.4% | -34.6% | -35.5% | -35.9% | -45.4% | -61.9% | -87.0% | -106.3% |
| ROCE | -91.2% | -91.2% | -55.1% | -35.4% | -37.5% | -36.0% | -92.4% | -90.1% | -81.0% | -94.8% | -82.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | 1.45 | 0.55 | 0.17 | 0.03 | — | — | 2.35 | 0.49 | 0.23 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | 1.35 | 0.53 | 0.15 | -0.39 | — | — | 1.78 | 0.47 | -0.28 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | -7.58 | -7.58 | -10.80 | -8.71 | -28.11 | -3.90 | -1.41 | -2.24 | -5.01 | -28.35 | -68.85 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.41 | 1.41 | 1.73 | 2.04 | 3.74 | 15.45 | 1.10 | 0.98 | 1.91 | 1.00 | 2.33 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 0.47 | 0.94 | 9.60 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.56 | 0.08 | 0.76 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 7.08 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.42 | 0.04 | 0.73 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.57 | 0.87 | 0.62 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 1.09 | 0.51 | 0.47 | — | 0.00 |
| Inventory Turnover | 0.69 | 0.69 | 1.06 | 0.78 | 0.41 | 0.78 | 1.57 | 0.82 | 0.70 | 0.14 | 0.05 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 10.80 | 27.36 | 106.90 | 73.06 | 130.66 | 26.87 | 90.91 | 27.19 | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $28M | $25M | $24M | $22M | $18M | $15M | $13M | $13M | $12M | $11M |
Imminent liquidity and solvency
Based on reported figures, GreenPower's P/S ratio of 1.90 suggests the market is pricing the firm as a speculative growth entity, yet the lack of positive earnings or cash flow multiples indicates that investors are struggling to anchor valuation in any tangible fundamental performance metrics.
The absence of meaningful P/E or EV/EBITDA multiples highlights the company's inability to generate consistent earnings, leaving the P/S ratio as the primary, albeit flawed, valuation anchor. This valuation appears disconnected from the reality of a contracting revenue base and suggests that the market may be overestimating the probability of a successful turnaround in delivery volumes.
As reported in financial statements, GreenPower's ROIC has consistently languished in negative territory, with the most recent quarterly data showing a -15.7% return, illustrating the company's failure to generate value from its invested capital while scaling its specialized electric vehicle manufacturing operations.
The persistent negative ROIC suggests that every dollar of capital deployed into the business is currently destroying shareholder value rather than compounding it. This trend warrants investigation into whether the company's 'CleanSheet' design philosophy is inherently too capital-intensive to achieve the necessary returns required to justify its current asset base.
According to quarterly filings, GreenPower's cash conversion cycle has reached extreme levels, peaking at 1,667 days in 2026Q1, which indicates a severe inability to manage inventory turnover and collect payments efficiently compared to the more streamlined operations of established industry incumbents like Blue Bird.
The bloated DIO and CCC metrics suggest that finished goods are sitting in inventory for extended periods, potentially signaling a mismatch between production schedules and actual municipal demand. This inefficiency ties up critical liquidity and increases the risk of inventory obsolescence, further straining the company's already precarious cash position.
Based on recent SEC filings, GreenPower's quick ratio has plummeted to 0.10, a level that underscores the company's extreme vulnerability to short-term obligations and highlights the lack of liquid assets available to cover its ongoing operational burn rate in the absence of new financing.
The current liquidity profile suggests that the company is operating with virtually no margin for error, leaving it highly susceptible to even minor delays in government grant disbursements or supply chain disruptions. Investors should monitor the company's ability to secure additional capital, as the current cash balance appears insufficient to sustain operations through the next fiscal cycle.
The most commonly misapplied metric for GreenPower is the 'order backlog,' which investors often treat as guaranteed future revenue, whereas in reality, these figures frequently represent non-binding commitments contingent on government grant approvals that may never materialize into actual cash inflows for the company.
Relying on backlog as a proxy for future growth obscures the high degree of execution risk and the volatility of the company's revenue recognition cycle. A more accurate assessment would involve discounting these orders based on historical grant capture rates, which would likely reveal a much smaller and more uncertain revenue pipeline than the headline backlog figure suggests.
Includes 30+ ratios · 15 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying GP stock.
GreenPower Motor Company Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -2.3x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
GreenPower Motor Company Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -374.7%. The historical average is -139.1%.
Based on historical data, GreenPower Motor Company Inc. is trading at a P/E of -2.3x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
GreenPower Motor Company Inc. has 11.1% gross margin and -90.3% operating margin.