Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -2.4x · EV/EBITDA 12.7x · ROE -186.8%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $96M | $94M | $143M | $185M | $258M | $423M | $109M | $90M | $53M | $89M | $47M |
| Enterprise Value | $587M | $585M | $630M | $664M | $626M | $656M | $201M | $189M | $133M | $169M | $122M |
| P/E Ratio → | -2.38 | — | — | — | — | 35.62 | 741.51 | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.49 | 0.77 | 1.58 | 2.35 | 0.87 | 0.55 | 0.33 | 0.55 | 0.32 |
| P/B Ratio | 37.76 | 37.05 | 3.52 | 2.38 | 2.59 | 3.75 | 1.93 | 1.61 | 0.89 | 1.71 | 0.83 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 17.19 | 37.96 | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 9.68 | 9.43 | 10.30 | 8.30 | 59.02 | 14.34 | 12.14 | 8.63 | 5.44 | 12.46 | 5.94 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.93 | 2.16 | 2.75 | 3.83 | 3.64 | 1.60 | 1.14 | 0.81 | 1.05 | 0.83 |
| EV / EBITDA | 12.66 | 12.61 | 14.05 | 22.19 | 30.36 | 14.65 | 11.06 | 13.01 | 8.39 | 10.79 | 8.62 |
| EV / EBIT | 155.15 | 154.51 | 1197.92 | 3976.37 | 49.18 | 17.16 | 17.99 | 30.41 | 24.26 | 35.23 | 30.74 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 31.60 | 79.48 | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 37.5% | 37.5% | 51.3% | 54.5% | 55.1% | 58.5% | 52.9% | 42.7% | 43.6% | 43.1% | 44.9% |
| Operating Margin | 1.3% | 1.3% | 0.9% | -0.5% | 7.8% | 20.8% | 8.3% | 3.8% | 4.5% | 4.4% | 4.2% |
| Net Profit Margin | -13.3% | -13.3% | -13.9% | -10.3% | -9.1% | 6.5% | 0.1% | -3.5% | -2.7% | -3.1% | -3.5% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -186.8% | -186.8% | -68.7% | -28.0% | -13.9% | 13.8% | 0.3% | -10.1% | -7.8% | -9.3% | -9.0% |
| ROA | -6.0% | -6.0% | -6.0% | -3.9% | -2.8% | 3.4% | 0.1% | -3.0% | -2.5% | -2.9% | -3.2% |
| ROIC | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.4% | -0.2% | 2.3% | 11.4% | 5.2% | 3.2% | 4.1% | 4.0% | 3.8% |
| ROCE | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.5% | -0.2% | 2.6% | 12.0% | 5.6% | 3.6% | 4.7% | 4.5% | 4.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 209.46 | 209.46 | 13.03 | 6.61 | 4.25 | 2.85 | 2.28 | 2.28 | 1.67 | 1.92 | 1.80 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 11.46 | 11.46 | 11.77 | 17.20 | 20.57 | 7.18 | 7.12 | 8.78 | 6.32 | 6.38 | 7.20 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 193.43 | 12.04 | 6.15 | 3.68 | 2.06 | 1.62 | 1.76 | 1.33 | 1.54 | 1.32 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 10.58 | 10.58 | 10.87 | 15.99 | 17.83 | 5.20 | 5.05 | 6.80 | 5.02 | 5.10 | 5.29 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | 14.41 | 41.52 | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.52 | 1.71 | 1.14 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.44 | 0.42 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.79 | 1.08 | 3.09 | 7.24 | 1.92 | 1.50 | 1.25 | 1.41 | 1.75 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.76 | 1.05 | 3.07 | 7.19 | 1.86 | 1.41 | 1.18 | 1.32 | 1.68 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.55 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.46 | 0.86 | 2.33 | 1.55 | 1.15 | 0.95 | 1.07 | 1.43 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.35 | 0.27 | 0.38 | 0.59 | 0.78 | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.82 |
| Inventory Turnover | 95.59 | 95.59 | 68.09 | 59.62 | 49.60 | 45.02 | 39.16 | 41.37 | 64.86 | 54.28 | 60.54 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 4.43 | 6.37 | 8.07 | 9.12 | 9.51 | 14.25 | 4.87 | 4.53 | 3.98 | 4.77 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | 2.8% | 0.1% | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.8% | 2.6% | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $36M | $35M | $35M | $34M | $35M | $28M | $27M | $26M | $23M | $20M |
High leverage execution risk
According to recent market data, FLL trades at an EV/EBITDA multiple of 12.76, which appears elevated relative to its negative net income and suggests investors are pricing in future growth from the Waukegan project rather than current cash-flow generation capabilities compared to peers like Monarch Casino.
The negative P/E ratio of -2.49 underscores the company's current inability to generate bottom-line earnings, forcing the market to rely on forward-looking EV/EBITDA multiples. This valuation approach implies a significant premium for potential project success, which may be vulnerable to downward revisions if the transition from temporary to permanent facilities faces further operational delays.
Based on reported financial statements, FLL's ROIC has remained near zero or negative over the last ten quarters, peaking at a marginal 0.5% in 2025Q3, which indicates that the company's aggressive capital deployment into new resorts is currently failing to generate adequate returns on invested capital.
The persistent decay in ROIC suggests that the capital-intensive nature of the Chamonix and American Place developments is outpacing the incremental earnings power of the underlying assets. Investors should monitor whether these returns can inflect positively once the current construction cycle concludes and depreciation charges stabilize against revenue growth.
As reported in recent filings, FLL maintains a negative cash conversion cycle, reaching -6 days in 2026Q1, which suggests that the company effectively utilizes supplier credit to manage its liquidity, though this efficiency is insufficient to offset the broader operational cash burn observed across the portfolio.
While the negative CCC indicates a favorable timing mismatch between payables and receivables, it does not compensate for the low asset turnover ratio of 0.11. This suggests that the company's core problem is not working capital management, but rather the inability of its high-fixed-cost asset base to generate sufficient revenue volume.
Based on the company's reported figures, the debt-to-equity ratio has surged to 209.46, a level that significantly exceeds industry norms and indicates that FLL's reliance on external financing has left the balance sheet highly vulnerable to interest rate volatility and potential refinancing risks in the near term.
The interest coverage ratio, which has frequently dipped into negative territory, highlights the precarious nature of the company's debt service obligations. This leverage profile suggests that any shortfall in projected gaming revenue could necessitate further dilutive financing, as the company lacks the internal cash flow to comfortably service its existing debt load.
Institutional analysts often misapply the P/E ratio to FLL, which obscures the company's true financial health by ignoring the heavy impact of non-cash depreciation and pre-opening expenses that currently render the metric meaningless for evaluating a company in the midst of a major capital-intensive development cycle.
Investors should instead prioritize EV/EBITDA or free cash flow yield, as these metrics better account for the company's capital structure and the non-cash charges associated with its resort expansion. Relying on P/E in this context risks misinterpreting accounting losses as permanent operational failure, while ignoring the underlying cash-generating potential of the assets once they reach maturity.
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
See how regular investing compounds over time.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying FLL stock.
Full House Resorts, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -2.4x. The historical average is 32.0x.
Full House Resorts, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 12.7x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 11.6x.
Full House Resorts, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -186.8%. The historical average is -9.3%.
Based on historical data, Full House Resorts, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -2.4x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Full House Resorts, Inc. has 37.5% gross margin and 1.3% operating margin.
Full House Resorts, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 11.5x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.