Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -4.0x · EV/EBITDA 16.7x · ROE -29.0%. (2004–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $14M | $18M | $11M | $49M | $35M | $130M | $43M | $60M | $50M | $153M | $211M |
| Enterprise Value | $33M | $37M | $30M | $68M | $51M | $135M | $53M | $77M | $53M | $156M | $230M |
| P/E Ratio → | -4.00 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.21 | 1.14 | 0.88 | 3.63 | 1.80 | 2.40 | 2.21 | 6.82 | 22.42 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.29 | 1.86 | 0.95 | 2.47 | 1.04 | 5.66 | 2.21 | 6.26 | 4.62 | 25.14 | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 18.78 | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 18.27 | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.65 | 0.59 | 1.59 | 1.26 | 3.78 | 2.19 | 3.10 | 2.33 | 6.95 | 24.45 |
| EV / EBITDA | 16.66 | 18.67 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 44.40 | 8.99 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | 916.32 | — | — | 17.60 | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 19.14 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 96.0% | 96.0% | 93.7% | 98.0% | 91.2% | 89.1% | 89.3% | 79.8% | 90.3% | 79.3% | -13.5% |
| Operating Margin | -0.7% | -0.7% | -20.3% | -46.6% | -11.3% | -15.4% | -10.9% | -16.3% | -18.4% | -4.9% | 188.4% |
| Net Profit Margin | -5.4% | -5.4% | -24.4% | -56.6% | -11.8% | -18.1% | -8.1% | -9.3% | -12.9% | 30.8% | -395.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -29.0% | -29.0% | -79.8% | -90.3% | -16.8% | -30.3% | -13.3% | -22.9% | -34.6% | 113.8% | — |
| ROA | -5.3% | -5.3% | -20.2% | -34.5% | -7.5% | -12.7% | -4.2% | -5.8% | -8.1% | 28.9% | -434.3% |
| ROIC | -1.0% | -1.0% | -22.4% | -33.9% | -8.8% | -14.5% | -7.0% | -15.1% | -27.6% | -9.2% | — |
| ROCE | -1.2% | -1.2% | -29.7% | -45.2% | -10.4% | -15.7% | -9.9% | -22.6% | -28.1% | -8.2% | — |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 2.94 | 2.94 | 2.37 | 1.28 | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.87 | 2.05 | 0.77 | 1.35 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | 14.44 | 14.44 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2.34 | 0.77 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.94 | 1.67 | 0.96 | 0.46 | 0.23 | 0.47 | 1.82 | 0.26 | 0.48 | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 9.54 | 9.54 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.83 | 0.75 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.36 | — |
| Interest Coverage | -0.38 | -0.38 | -5.01 | -9.64 | -4.04 | -7.18 | 0.03 | -0.08 | -2.81 | 5.55 | -6.88 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.76 | 0.75 | 0.94 | 1.22 | 0.82 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.21 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.76 | 0.75 | 0.90 | 1.18 | 0.78 | 0.31 | 0.43 | 0.47 | 0.18 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.51 | 0.47 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.02 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.97 | 0.88 | 0.65 | 0.54 | 0.68 | 0.49 | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.67 | 0.66 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | 3.16 | 7.16 | 3.61 | — | 2.97 | — | 8.53 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 84.28 | 74.61 | 105.48 | 145.46 | 98.14 | 56.02 | 52.28 | 51.36 | 60.27 | 142.52 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.3% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $12M | $10M | $14M | $10M | $8M | $6M | $4M | $3M | $2M | $877819 |
Persistent Operating Losses
Based on current market data, DLPN trades at a P/S ratio of 0.26, which appears to reflect significant investor skepticism regarding the company's ability to convert its niche agency presence into a scalable, profitable entertainment ecosystem rather than a collection of high-cost, low-margin service entities.
The negative TTM P/E of -4.21 highlights the absence of GAAP earnings, forcing investors to rely on revenue-based multiples that may undervalue the potential of the content production arm. This valuation suggests the market is pricing in a conglomerate discount, likely due to the historical volatility of project-based revenue and the persistent dilution required to fund operations.
As reported in recent financial statements, DLPN's ROIC has fluctuated significantly, reaching -5.7% in 2026Q1, which indicates that the company is currently destroying shareholder value rather than compounding it through its acquisition-heavy strategy and high-fixed-cost operating model.
The inability to maintain positive returns on invested capital suggests that the synergies expected from the 'super-group' agency structure have yet to materialize in a way that offsets the costs of integration and talent retention. Investors should monitor whether the shift toward IP ownership can eventually drive returns above the company's cost of capital, a threshold that remains elusive under the current fee-for-service dominance.
According to quarterly filings, the company's DSO has remained elevated, averaging over 80 days, which suggests that Dolphin Entertainment faces significant challenges in managing its cash conversion cycle and collecting payments from clients in a timely manner compared to industry standards.
The high DSO, combined with the lack of consistent inventory data, points to a business model that is highly sensitive to the payment terms of its entertainment clients. This inefficiency in working capital management exacerbates the company's liquidity constraints, as cash is frequently tied up in receivables rather than being available for reinvestment or debt service.
Based on the most recent balance sheet data, the current ratio of 0.73 in 2026Q1 indicates a vulnerable liquidity position, suggesting that the company may struggle to meet its short-term obligations without relying on external financing or further equity dilution.
The lack of a sufficient liquidity cushion leaves the company exposed to any unexpected downturns in the entertainment sector or delays in project-based revenue recognition. Given the high fixed costs associated with elite talent, this tight liquidity profile warrants close monitoring as it limits the company's operational flexibility during periods of market stress.
The most commonly misapplied metric for DLPN is the gross margin, which, at 96%, obscures the reality that the company's primary expense is professional labor, which is categorized as an operating expense rather than a cost of goods sold.
Analysts should instead focus on operating margins and EBITDA, as these metrics better capture the true cost of the human capital required to maintain the agency's competitive moat. Relying on gross margin alone creates a false sense of profitability that ignores the structural reality of a service-based business model.
Includes 30+ ratios · 22 years · Updated daily
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
See how regular investing compounds over time.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying DLPN stock.
Dolphin Entertainment, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -4.0x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Dolphin Entertainment, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 16.7x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 16.8x.
Dolphin Entertainment, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -29.0%. The historical average is -22.6%.
Based on historical data, Dolphin Entertainment, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -4.0x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Dolphin Entertainment, Inc. has 96.0% gross margin and -0.7% operating margin.
Dolphin Entertainment, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 14.4x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.