Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 25.2x · EV/EBITDA 17.3x · ROE 40.4%. (2011–2026 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $5.3B | $6.3B | $7.8B | $7.7B | $1.8B | $6.9B | $9.6B | $6.4B |
| Enterprise Value | $3.5B | $3.4B | $5.3B | $8.7B | $9.7B | $10.6B | $10.9B | $5.5B | $9.3B | $10.3B | $6.3B |
| P/E Ratio → | 25.21 | 22.43 | — | — | 10.22 | 9.46 | 9.31 | — | 12.78 | 16.25 | 11.58 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.64 | 0.60 | 0.54 | 1.19 | 1.12 | 1.38 | 1.35 | 0.32 | 1.32 | 2.04 | 1.43 |
| P/B Ratio | 27.69 | 24.64 | 6.45 | 3.31 | 3.41 | 3.04 | 3.55 | 0.81 | 2.85 | 4.76 | 4.02 |
| P/FCF | 159.69 | 147.84 | 15.69 | 44.17 | 11.56 | 13.57 | 14.92 | 2.77 | 13.60 | 10.26 | 7.47 |
| P/OCF | 29.04 | 26.88 | 8.54 | 17.15 | 8.17 | 11.05 | 12.26 | 2.05 | 9.99 | 9.06 | 6.23 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.97 | 1.20 | 1.95 | 1.72 | 1.88 | 1.92 | 1.00 | 1.78 | 2.19 | 1.40 |
| EV / EBITDA | 17.34 | 16.53 | — | — | 11.25 | 9.72 | 9.91 | 97.08 | 9.72 | 10.80 | 6.94 |
| EV / EBIT | 42.94 | 40.91 | 102.65 | 166.86 | 11.53 | 10.46 | 10.67 | 9.92 | 14.16 | 11.70 | 7.01 |
| EV / FCF | — | 239.63 | 34.89 | 72.31 | 17.71 | 18.58 | 21.18 | 8.70 | 18.29 | 11.01 | 7.36 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 58.9% | 58.9% | 63.6% | 63.6% | 66.3% | 66.2% | 66.2% | 58.9% | 60.7% | 60.6% | 59.2% |
| Operating Margin | 2.4% | 2.4% | -16.9% | -16.9% | 12.1% | 16.0% | 16.0% | -3.5% | 14.0% | 15.9% | 15.4% |
| Net Profit Margin | 2.6% | 2.6% | -26.6% | -26.6% | 11.0% | 14.5% | 14.5% | -4.0% | 10.4% | 12.5% | 12.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 40.4% | 40.4% | -119.9% | -68.5% | 28.0% | 34.9% | 38.0% | -9.7% | 24.4% | 32.7% | 30.8% |
| ROA | 2.2% | 2.2% | -19.9% | -16.9% | 8.3% | 11.0% | 10.7% | -3.1% | 10.1% | 18.3% | 22.2% |
| ROIC | 2.6% | 2.6% | -13.6% | -11.1% | 9.6% | 12.5% | 12.0% | -2.7% | 14.6% | 26.5% | 37.0% |
| ROCE | 2.7% | 2.7% | -17.0% | -13.9% | 11.5% | 15.3% | 14.6% | -3.3% | 17.9% | 30.3% | 34.7% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 16.90 | 16.90 | 8.34 | 2.23 | 1.95 | 1.19 | 1.60 | 2.01 | 1.06 | 0.43 | 0.08 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 7.00 | 7.00 | — | — | 4.20 | 2.77 | 3.14 | 76.61 | 2.67 | 0.91 | 0.15 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 15.30 | 7.90 | 2.11 | 1.81 | 1.12 | 1.49 | 1.74 | 0.98 | 0.35 | -0.06 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 6.33 | 6.33 | — | — | 3.91 | 2.62 | 2.93 | 66.23 | 2.49 | 0.74 | -0.10 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 91.79 | 19.20 | 28.13 | 6.16 | 5.01 | 6.27 | 5.94 | 4.69 | 0.76 | -0.11 |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | 1.41 | 8.67 | 34.88 | — | 23.67 | 31.00 | 17.34 | 39.64 | 225.00 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.21 | 1.21 | 1.14 | 0.95 | 1.29 | 1.21 | 0.95 | 1.35 | 1.12 | 1.31 | 2.06 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.49 | 0.44 | 0.56 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.76 | 0.50 | 0.63 | 1.09 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.42 | 0.11 | 0.17 | 0.40 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.07 | 0.85 | 0.66 | 0.77 | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.70 | 0.79 | 1.16 | 1.87 |
| Inventory Turnover | 2.46 | 2.46 | 1.86 | 1.87 | 1.79 | 1.74 | 2.60 | 2.76 | 2.16 | 2.82 | 3.34 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 31.52 | 26.38 | 31.39 | 25.27 | 29.95 | 25.69 | 20.98 | 26.69 | 23.20 | 21.59 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 4.0% | 4.5% | — | — | 9.8% | 10.6% | 10.7% | — | 7.8% | 6.2% | 8.6% |
| FCF Yield | 0.6% | 0.7% | 6.4% | 2.3% | 8.7% | 7.4% | 6.7% | 36.2% | 7.4% | 9.8% | 13.4% |
| Buyback Yield | 3.6% | 3.9% | 0.2% | 2.0% | 21.7% | 8.5% | 0.0% | 5.8% | 3.0% | 3.7% | 15.7% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 3.6% | 3.9% | 0.2% | 2.0% | 21.7% | 8.5% | 0.0% | 5.8% | 3.0% | 3.7% | 15.7% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $120M | $118M | $117M | $134M | $152M | $152M | $151M | $152M | $155M | $168M |
Structural brand demand erosion
As reported in recent financial filings, CPRI's forward P/E of 13.79 suggests the market is pricing the company as a distressed turnaround rather than a luxury peer, especially when compared to the significantly higher multiples commanded by more stable entities like Ralph Lauren or Tapestry.
The current valuation appears to discount the potential for a sustained recovery, reflecting deep skepticism regarding the brand's ability to regain pricing power. Investors should monitor whether this multiple compression is a value opportunity or a rational response to the ongoing erosion of the company's core Michael Kors segment.
Based on the latest quarterly data, CPRI's ROIC has trended into negative territory, reaching -0.3% in 2026Q4, which indicates that the company is currently destroying shareholder value rather than compounding it through its capital-intensive retail and wholesale operations.
The collapse in returns on invested capital suggests that the firm's multi-tier luxury architecture is failing to generate adequate returns on the capital deployed into store footprints and inventory. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the current asset base is permanently impaired or if management can pivot toward a less capital-intensive model.
According to the provided financial statements, the cash conversion cycle has expanded to 115 days in 2026Q4, driven primarily by an elevated days inventory outstanding of 183 days, which highlights significant inefficiencies in managing stock levels during a period of declining consumer demand.
The inability to move inventory efficiently suggests that the company is forced to hold stale merchandise, which likely necessitates future margin-diluting markdowns. This inefficiency in working capital management appears to be a structural drag on cash flow that prevents the company from achieving a leaner, more responsive operational profile.
As reported in recent balance sheet data, CPRI's debt-to-equity ratio has surged to 16.90 in 2026Q4, a dramatic increase that signals extreme financial stress as the company's equity base has been rapidly depleted by persistent operating losses and asset impairments.
The current leverage profile leaves the company with virtually no margin for error, as the high debt load relative to a shrinking equity base limits the firm's ability to fund necessary brand reinvestment. Investors should monitor the company's ability to manage these obligations without further diluting shareholders or liquidating core assets.
The P/E ratio is frequently misapplied to CPRI, as reported in market commentary, because it obscures the massive volatility in net income caused by non-recurring items and impairment charges that do not reflect the underlying cash-generating capacity of the luxury retail business.
Analysts should instead focus on EV/Sales or adjusted EBITDA metrics to better gauge the company's true operational health, as the P/E ratio is heavily distorted by the current collapse in earnings. Relying on P/E in this context may lead to a false sense of value that ignores the structural risks to the company's long-term profitability.
Includes 30+ ratios · 16 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying CPRI stock.
Capri Holdings Limited's current P/E ratio is 25.2x. The historical average is 19.8x. This places it at the 75th percentile of its historical range.
Capri Holdings Limited's current EV/EBITDA is 17.3x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 19.4x.
Capri Holdings Limited's return on equity (ROE) is 40.4%. This is above the typical threshold of 15-20% considered good for most companies. The historical average is 20.1%.
Based on historical data, Capri Holdings Limited is trading at a P/E of 25.2x. This is at the 75th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Capri Holdings Limited has 58.9% gross margin and 2.4% operating margin.
Capri Holdings Limited's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 7.0x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.