Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 35.6x · EV/EBITDA 6.9x · ROE 4.1%. (2014–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $637M | $753M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $959M | $1.1B | $760M | $819M | $1.5B | $2.1B | — |
| Enterprise Value | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $2.2B | $2.6B | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 35.63 | 38.13 | 24.07 | 10.90 | 55.08 | 107.27 | — | — | 39.09 | 9.21 | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.88 | 1.04 | 1.62 | 1.88 | 1.47 | 1.84 | 1.39 | 1.35 | 2.29 | 3.30 | — |
| P/B Ratio | 1.49 | 1.59 | 2.28 | 2.63 | 2.49 | 2.88 | 2.23 | 0.72 | 0.93 | 1.23 | — |
| P/FCF | 4.33 | 5.11 | 7.81 | 11.17 | 8.82 | 9.66 | 6.23 | 10.20 | 10.16 | 13.51 | — |
| P/OCF | 4.20 | 4.97 | 7.66 | 9.47 | 7.46 | 8.32 | 5.48 | 8.07 | 9.27 | 11.13 | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.61 | 2.19 | 2.52 | 2.14 | 2.53 | 2.33 | 2.39 | 3.30 | 4.19 | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 6.90 | 7.66 | 9.79 | 11.21 | 8.72 | 10.48 | — | — | 11.63 | 11.78 | — |
| EV / EBIT | 17.42 | 12.23 | 16.72 | 34.40 | 24.18 | 32.67 | — | — | 25.80 | 19.56 | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 7.91 | 10.52 | 15.01 | 12.87 | 13.26 | 10.47 | 18.05 | 14.62 | 17.15 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 83.0% | 83.0% | 82.7% | 82.3% | 82.4% | 81.7% | 81.5% | 83.6% | 86.1% | 89.5% | 79.5% |
| Operating Margin | 8.3% | 8.3% | 7.4% | 7.9% | 10.1% | 7.8% | -162.1% | -73.5% | 12.7% | 21.4% | 27.9% |
| Net Profit Margin | 2.8% | 2.8% | 6.7% | 17.2% | 2.6% | 1.7% | -149.2% | -73.4% | 5.9% | 35.8% | 27.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 4.1% | 4.1% | 9.6% | 27.0% | 4.4% | 2.9% | -110.3% | -32.2% | 2.3% | 11.0% | 7.5% |
| ROA | 1.8% | 1.8% | 4.2% | 10.8% | 1.7% | 1.0% | -52.7% | -19.2% | 1.5% | 8.9% | 7.0% |
| ROIC | 5.0% | 5.0% | 4.3% | 4.6% | 6.0% | 4.3% | -50.7% | -16.5% | 2.8% | 4.3% | 5.6% |
| ROCE | 6.2% | 6.2% | 5.3% | 5.6% | 7.2% | 5.1% | -60.9% | -20.2% | 3.4% | 5.5% | 7.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.89 | 0.98 | 1.23 | 1.17 | 1.72 | 0.56 | 0.43 | 0.34 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.08 | 3.08 | 2.83 | 3.12 | 2.94 | 3.10 | — | — | 3.69 | 2.59 | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.87 | 0.79 | 0.90 | 1.15 | 1.07 | 1.52 | 0.55 | 0.41 | 0.33 | -0.00 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 2.71 | 2.71 | 2.52 | 2.86 | 2.75 | 2.84 | — | — | 3.55 | 2.50 | -0.03 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 2.80 | 2.71 | 3.83 | 4.05 | 3.60 | 4.23 | 7.84 | 4.47 | 3.64 | -0.05 |
| Interest Coverage | 1.56 | 1.56 | 2.92 | 1.56 | 1.64 | 1.24 | -23.74 | -14.44 | 3.05 | 10.85 | — |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.87 | 1.87 | 1.83 | 1.22 | 1.40 | 1.56 | 1.97 | 1.24 | 1.39 | 1.58 | 1.66 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.87 | 1.87 | 1.83 | 1.22 | 1.40 | 1.56 | 1.97 | 1.24 | 1.31 | 1.46 | 1.66 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.43 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 0.75 | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.12 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.68 | 0.65 | 0.59 | 0.64 | 0.62 | 0.51 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 9.76 | 12.25 | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 66.59 | 67.88 | 66.40 | 60.25 | 57.88 | 62.43 | 61.22 | 60.04 | 58.78 | 56.67 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 31.4% | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 289.6% | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 2.8% | 2.6% | 4.2% | 9.2% | 1.8% | 0.9% | — | — | 2.6% | 10.9% | — |
| FCF Yield | 23.1% | 19.6% | 12.8% | 9.0% | 11.3% | 10.4% | 16.0% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 7.4% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 13.6% | 11.5% | 4.2% | 2.4% | 5.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.9% | 6.4% | 0.0% | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 13.6% | 11.5% | 4.2% | 2.4% | 5.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 4.9% | 6.4% | 31.4% | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $62M | $67M | $68M | $70M | $71M | $67M | $67M | $71M | $72M | $72M |
High leverage relative to equity
According to current market data, CARS trades at a forward P/E of 5.10, which suggests that investors are pricing in significant long-term stagnation rather than the growth potential typically associated with digital marketplace platforms when compared to peers like CarGurus.
The valuation gap relative to higher-growth peers appears to be a direct consequence of the company's inability to translate its platform traffic into consistent top-line expansion. While the low forward multiple may appear attractive, it likely reflects a market consensus that the core business model is mature and faces structural headwinds that limit future earnings upside.
Based on reported financial statements, CARS has struggled to generate meaningful returns on invested capital, with ROIC consistently hovering in the low single digits, peaking at only 1.9% in 2025Q4, which indicates a failure to effectively compound capital within the current business model.
The persistent inability to drive ROIC above the cost of capital suggests that the company's historical acquisitions have not yet yielded the expected synergies or operational efficiencies. Investors should monitor whether management can improve capital allocation, as the current trend of low returns appears to be a structural drag on long-term shareholder value creation.
As indicated by recent quarterly filings, the company's asset turnover ratio remains stagnant at approximately 0.17, highlighting a lack of operational leverage and suggesting that the firm's heavy investment in platform infrastructure is not yet driving a proportional increase in revenue generation.
The stability of the cash conversion cycle is difficult to assess given the volatility in reported payables, but the consistently low asset turnover implies that the business remains capital-intensive despite its digital nature. This lack of efficiency warrants further investigation into whether the company's sales and marketing spend is truly optimized for customer retention.
According to recent balance sheet data, the company maintains a debt-to-EBITDA ratio exceeding 11.0x in most periods, which suggests that the firm's ability to service its debt obligations is increasingly constrained by its limited operating margin and stagnant revenue growth profile.
The high leverage ratio, combined with an interest coverage ratio that has dipped as low as 0.84 in 2025Q1, indicates that the company's financial position is vulnerable to even minor operational disruptions. This level of indebtedness appears to leave little room for strategic pivots or aggressive investment in new growth initiatives without further straining the balance sheet.
Based on an analysis of the company's financial structure, the P/E ratio is the most commonly misapplied metric for CARS, as it fails to account for the significant non-cash amortization charges stemming from historical acquisitions that artificially depress reported net income.
Investors should instead focus on EV/EBITDA or P/FCF to better understand the company's true cash-generative capacity, as these metrics strip away the accounting noise that obscures the underlying performance of the business. Relying solely on P/E may lead to an inaccurate assessment of the company's valuation relative to its actual operational health.
Includes 30+ ratios · 12 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying CARS stock.
Cars.com Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 35.6x. The historical average is 40.5x. This places it at the 43th percentile of its historical range.
Cars.com Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 6.9x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 10.2x.
Cars.com Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 4.1%. The historical average is -3.5%.
Based on historical data, Cars.com Inc. is trading at a P/E of 35.6x. This is at the 43th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Cars.com Inc. has 83.0% gross margin and 8.3% operating margin.
Cars.com Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 3.1x, indicating high leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.