Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -0.1x · EV/EBITDA 5.3x · ROE -92.3%. (2016–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $89M | $425M | $1.0B | $248M | $359M | $910M | $2.1B | $2.8B | $2.2B | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $622M | $4.1B | $-94745023 | $-682152854 | $1.1B | $1.5B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $917M | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -0.14 | — | 3.38 | — | — | — | 0.63 | 7.05 | 7.35 | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.13 | 0.09 | 1.27 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 1.04 | 1.93 | 2.04 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.25 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.25 | 0.51 | 0.42 | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | 0.24 | — | — | — | 7.31 | 13.09 | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | 0.24 | — | — | — | 6.57 | 12.07 | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.84 | -0.12 | -0.40 | 0.53 | 0.38 | 1.59 | 2.35 | 0.84 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 5.29 | 5.07 | -0.51 | — | — | — | 9.96 | 10.13 | 3.23 | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | -0.54 | -11.43 | — | 17.96 | 10.18 | 6.74 | 2.21 | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | -0.67 | — | — | — | 8.90 | 5.38 | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 4.1% | 4.1% | 55.3% | 11.2% | 7.6% | 24.6% | 46.5% | 58.6% | 60.2% | 63.3% | 60.8% |
| Operating Margin | -0.4% | -0.4% | 22.2% | -4.3% | -47.8% | -0.6% | 15.5% | 22.5% | 25.4% | 44.7% | 42.5% |
| Net Profit Margin | -65.8% | -65.8% | 37.3% | -2.2% | -56.1% | -0.2% | 164.2% | 27.1% | 27.7% | 32.4% | 29.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -92.3% | -92.3% | 7.6% | -0.9% | -19.6% | -0.1% | 48.6% | 7.3% | 23.5% | — | — |
| ROA | -45.6% | -45.6% | 5.6% | -0.6% | -12.4% | -0.1% | 32.3% | 4.9% | 6.5% | 25.2% | 18.0% |
| ROIC | -0.3% | -0.3% | 4.6% | -1.4% | -11.3% | -0.2% | 3.1% | 4.8% | 65.6% | — | — |
| ROCE | -0.3% | -0.3% | 4.5% | -1.8% | -15.8% | -0.3% | 4.1% | 5.6% | 7.7% | 49.5% | 43.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.41 | 1.41 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.47 | 0.30 | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | 4.90 | 4.90 | 0.91 | — | — | — | 7.83 | 7.80 | 5.64 | 0.37 | 1.02 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.31 | -0.27 | -0.24 | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.11 | -0.25 | — | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 4.54 | 4.54 | -6.04 | — | — | — | 3.47 | 1.81 | -4.62 | -1.33 | 0.78 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | -0.91 | — | — | — | 1.59 | -7.71 | -1.08 | 1.80 |
| Interest Coverage | -21.64 | -21.64 | 267.35 | 14.56 | -38.51 | 5.69 | 116.20 | 37.25 | 21.83 | 37.05 | 411.73 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.71 | 0.71 | 1.88 | 4.99 | 2.16 | 2.23 | 3.62 | 1.90 | 3.04 | 2.11 | 1.05 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.71 | 0.71 | 1.88 | 4.99 | 2.16 | 2.21 | 3.62 | 1.57 | 2.85 | 1.97 | 1.02 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.23 | 0.23 | 1.37 | 2.13 | 0.92 | 1.18 | 2.35 | 0.89 | 2.03 | 1.64 | 0.53 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.61 | 0.13 | 0.37 | 0.28 | 0.36 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.53 | 0.61 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | 48.26 | 113.29 | 0.56 | 1.45 | 5.34 | 20.00 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 353.13 | 48.61 | 99.81 | 289.65 | 230.19 | 452.87 | 471.18 | 406.61 | 30.04 | 116.85 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | 100.0% | 88.8% | 12.6% | 7.9% | 1.2% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7.9% | 56.1% | 8.9% | — | 0.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 29.5% | — | — | — | 158.6% | 14.2% | 13.6% | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | 413.2% | — | — | — | 13.7% | 7.6% | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 1.5% | 2.1% | 8.9% | 99.6% | 29.5% | 48.8% | 2.3% | 0.7% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.5% | 2.1% | 8.9% | 99.6% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 14.9% | 8.6% | 1.2% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $283M | $466M | $486M | $548M | $580M | $608M | $607M | $562M | $506M | $506M |
Unsustainable capital intensity
According to recent market data, Cango trades at a P/S multiple of 0.11, which, when viewed alongside the absence of a positive P/E, suggests that investors are heavily discounting the firm's transition to a low-margin, inventory-heavy automotive trading model compared to its historical fintech-focused valuation.
The current EV/EBITDA of 5.20 appears to be a misleading indicator of value given the company's massive net losses and the volatility inherent in its pivot to vehicle wholesaling. This valuation suggests the market is pricing the company as a distressed asset rather than a growth-stage platform, as the lack of forward earnings visibility makes traditional multiple-based comparisons to peers like Autohome largely irrelevant.
As reported in financial statements, Cango's gross margin plummeted to -49.9% in 2025Q4, indicating that the company is currently failing to cover the direct costs of vehicle procurement, a stark departure from the double-digit margins maintained during its previous life as a financing facilitation provider.
The shift to a high-volume trading model has effectively stripped away the company's ability to generate sustainable operating income. Investors should monitor whether this margin compression is a temporary byproduct of aggressive market share acquisition or a structural flaw in the unit economics of the Cango Haoche platform.
Based on the latest quarterly figures, Cango's ROIC has deteriorated to -14.7% in 2025Q4, reflecting a rapid destruction of shareholder value as the company deploys significant capital into physical logistics and inventory rather than the asset-light service models that previously defined its return profile.
The transition from a high-margin service provider to an asset-heavy wholesaler has fundamentally impaired the company's ability to compound capital. This negative trend warrants further investigation into whether the current infrastructure investments can ever achieve the scale necessary to generate returns above the cost of capital.
According to historical data, Cango's asset turnover has slowed to 0.14 in 2025Q4, a significant decline from previous periods, which suggests that the company's massive investment in vehicle inventory is not translating into the rapid throughput required to sustain its current business model.
The lengthening of the cash conversion cycle, evidenced by rising DSO and inventory dependence, indicates that the company is struggling to manage its working capital effectively. This inefficiency appears to be a direct consequence of the shift toward physical car commerce, which requires far more liquidity than the legacy loan facilitation business.
The most commonly misapplied metric for Cango is the top-line revenue growth rate, which, as reported in recent filings, masks the underlying deterioration in contribution margins and the unsustainable cash burn associated with the company's pivot to a gross-basis automotive trading model.
Analysts should prioritize 'Contribution Margin per Vehicle' over headline revenue growth to properly assess the viability of the trading platform. Relying on revenue growth in this context obscures the fact that the company is essentially scaling a loss-making activity, which may not be sustainable without a fundamental change in pricing power or procurement costs.
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying CANG stock.
Cango Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -0.1x. The historical average is 4.6x.
Cango Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 5.3x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 7.1x.
Cango Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -92.3%. The historical average is -3.2%.
Based on historical data, Cango Inc. is trading at a P/E of -0.1x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Cango Inc. has 4.1% gross margin and -0.4% operating margin.
Cango Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 4.9x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.