Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 3.1x · EV/EBITDA 2.7x · ROE 10.2%. (2000–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $134M | $129M | $124M | $98M | $178M | $83M | $194M | $99M | $77M | $152M | $171M |
| Enterprise Value | $202M | $196M | $235M | $125M | $103M | $81M | $141M | $147M | $52M | $244M | $261M |
| P/E Ratio → | 3.13 | 3.00 | 4.14 | 2.58 | 8.41 | 19.14 | — | 14.32 | 32.49 | — | 7.66 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.34 | 0.17 | 0.46 | 0.23 | 0.16 | 0.30 | 0.37 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.54 | 0.25 | 0.61 | 0.32 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.56 |
| P/FCF | 1.88 | 1.80 | — | — | 6.45 | 4.50 | 4.75 | — | — | 6.65 | — |
| P/OCF | 1.20 | 1.15 | 12.66 | 4.90 | 3.70 | 2.92 | 3.38 | 3.27 | 6.16 | 3.03 | 14.49 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.26 | 0.36 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.16 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.11 | 0.49 | 0.56 |
| EV / EBITDA | 2.73 | 2.66 | 3.89 | 2.16 | 3.12 | 2.47 | 10.15 | 6.09 | 3.75 | 7.19 | 7.06 |
| EV / EBIT | 3.39 | 3.10 | 5.12 | 2.55 | 4.21 | 8.21 | — | 26.38 | 122.04 | 10.80 | 9.96 |
| EV / FCF | — | 2.75 | — | — | 3.75 | 4.40 | 3.46 | — | — | 10.68 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 19.0% | 19.0% | 16.8% | 18.0% | 15.7% | 14.5% | 13.3% | 14.4% | 13.2% | 17.0% | 17.5% |
| Operating Margin | 7.8% | 7.8% | 6.2% | 6.8% | 1.5% | 1.1% | -2.0% | 1.4% | -0.6% | 3.9% | 5.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | 5.6% | 5.6% | 4.6% | 6.5% | 4.0% | 2.2% | -1.2% | 2.3% | 0.5% | -3.9% | 4.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 10.2% | 10.2% | 7.9% | 10.8% | 6.4% | 3.4% | -1.6% | 3.2% | 0.8% | -6.3% | 7.3% |
| ROA | 4.6% | 4.6% | 3.7% | 5.1% | 3.0% | 1.6% | -0.7% | 1.5% | 0.3% | -2.9% | 3.6% |
| ROIC | 8.8% | 8.8% | 6.7% | 9.1% | 2.0% | 1.4% | -2.0% | 1.5% | -0.6% | 3.6% | 4.6% |
| ROCE | 13.9% | 13.9% | 10.4% | 10.7% | 2.2% | 1.5% | -2.3% | 1.8% | -0.8% | 5.9% | 7.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.14 | 0.38 | 0.14 | 0.40 | 0.20 | 0.51 | 0.39 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 2.84 | 2.84 | 2.79 | 2.46 | 1.41 | 3.98 | 3.20 | 5.16 | 4.41 | 4.62 | 3.26 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.15 | 0.29 | 0.08 | -0.23 | -0.01 | -0.16 | 0.15 | -0.08 | 0.30 | 0.29 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 0.91 | 0.91 | 1.84 | 0.48 | -2.25 | -0.06 | -3.79 | 1.97 | -1.81 | 2.72 | 2.42 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 0.95 | — | — | -2.71 | -0.11 | -1.29 | — | — | 4.04 | — |
| Interest Coverage | 37.08 | 37.08 | 25.34 | 39.92 | 16.89 | 6.84 | -5.68 | 1.63 | 0.12 | 10.12 | 20.69 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.36 | 1.36 | 1.32 | 1.47 | 1.43 | 1.43 | 1.34 | 1.45 | 1.45 | 1.43 | 1.50 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.13 | 1.13 | 1.07 | 1.18 | 1.12 | 1.09 | 1.09 | 1.18 | 1.19 | 1.21 | 1.29 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.19 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.30 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.19 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.76 | 0.77 | 0.75 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 0.59 | 0.65 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 0.73 |
| Inventory Turnover | 4.99 | 4.99 | 4.81 | 4.20 | 3.98 | 3.66 | 4.10 | 4.45 | 4.89 | 5.23 | 5.60 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 173.46 | 193.85 | 170.61 | 154.62 | 154.16 | 204.63 | 197.13 | 188.58 | 215.08 | 242.29 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.6% | 1.7% | 18.1% | — | — | — | 0.0% | — | — | — | 0.3% |
| Payout Ratio | 5.1% | 5.1% | 74.8% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2.4% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 31.9% | 33.3% | 24.1% | 38.7% | 11.9% | 5.2% | — | 7.0% | 3.1% | — | 13.1% |
| FCF Yield | 53.1% | 55.5% | — | — | 15.5% | 22.2% | 21.1% | — | — | 15.0% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 1.4% | 0.0% | 1.5% | 1.3% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 1.1% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.6% | 1.7% | 18.2% | 0.0% | 1.4% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 1.4% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $30M | $30M | $30M | $31M | $31M | $31M | $31M | $32M | $32M | $32M |
Cyclical OEM demand volatility
According to current market data, CAAS trades at a P/E of 3.13 and a P/S of 0.17, suggesting that investors are heavily discounting the company's earnings potential compared to peers like Dorman Products, which commands a significantly higher valuation multiple despite similar cyclical exposure.
The valuation gap appears to stem from a market-wide skepticism regarding the quality of earnings and the sustainability of growth in the Chinese automotive sector. Investors should monitor whether this low multiple represents a value opportunity or a permanent discount due to the company's small-cap status and geographic concentration.
Based on reported figures, CAAS has struggled to generate meaningful returns, with ROIC hovering between 1.3% and 3.0% over the last ten quarters, which indicates that the company is failing to compound capital effectively compared to the double-digit returns seen in more mature automotive parts suppliers.
The low ROIC suggests that the company's heavy investment in manufacturing infrastructure and R&D for EPS technology has yet to yield a competitive return on invested capital. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the current asset base is over-capitalized relative to the actual volume of profitable steering system contracts.
As reported in financial statements, the company's cash conversion cycle has remained elevated, reaching 118 days in 2025Q2, which reflects significant inefficiencies in managing inventory and receivables compared to the leaner operational standards observed in global Tier-1 automotive component manufacturers.
The extended DSO and DIO figures suggest that CAAS lacks the leverage to dictate favorable payment terms to its large OEM customers, effectively forcing the company to act as a financier for its clients. This working capital burden appears to be a structural drag on free cash flow generation.
According to recent SEC filings, CAAS maintains a current ratio of 1.40 and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.38, which indicates a robust liquidity position that provides a necessary safety buffer against the inherent volatility of the Chinese automotive production cycle and potential supply chain disruptions.
The company's ability to maintain such low leverage in a capital-intensive industry is a notable strength, though it may also suggest an overly conservative capital allocation strategy. Investors should consider whether this liquidity is being deployed efficiently or if it is simply sitting idle, failing to drive shareholder value.
The P/E ratio is the most commonly misapplied metric for CAAS, as it fails to account for the company's significant cash-to-market-cap ratio, which effectively masks the true liquidation value of the business and ignores the potential for capital return or strategic reinvestment.
Analysts should prioritize EV/EBITDA or P/FCF over P/E to better understand the company's operational earning power, as the P/E ratio is heavily distorted by the large cash balance and non-operating income. Relying on P/E alone risks misinterpreting the company's valuation by ignoring the underlying asset-heavy nature of its manufacturing operations.
Includes 30+ ratios · 26 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying CAAS stock.
China Automotive Systems, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 3.1x. The historical average is 20.1x. This places it at the 10th percentile of its historical range.
China Automotive Systems, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 2.7x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 7.6x.
China Automotive Systems, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 10.2%. The historical average is 8.6%.
Based on historical data, China Automotive Systems, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 3.1x. This is at the 10th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
China Automotive Systems, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 1.63% with a payout ratio of 5.1%.
China Automotive Systems, Inc. has 19.0% gross margin and 7.8% operating margin.
China Automotive Systems, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 2.8x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.